The subject of æsthetics
                                                           Walter du Halde 
 
Este trabajo contiene 104 pág. en inglés, los siguientes trabajos están escritos en  castellano ya que es nuestro idioma,así que descansaremos del  consabido ingles rutinario.

hay trabajos más  abajo: The  Epistemological Limits of the creative Interpretations

                                                 The cultural Process 

                                             Interaction  between Science and and  Art  

             Art, Culture and Aesthetics Education                                                         

                                          Walter du Halde    

 


The essence of art have been provided at different stages of history, artists and theoretics have not always adopted the same approach to this  question. They  have  formulated their answers on the basis of their own view of the world, the character and stage of development of art itself, its place in society and its role  and significance in the cultural life of the age. Yet throughout the whole evolution of aesthetic doctrines  the materialist view of  art  as a specific form of the reality has asserted itself, overcoming contradictions and errors in its path.
                                  Materialism sets great store by the progressive aesthetic thought of past ages, the generalizations and conclusions put forward with regard to the  nature of artistic creativity and the aesthetic relationship  between  art and reality. Yet these theories of the past were in many respects historically circumscribed: before the laws of history had been  properly formulated it was impossible for aestheticians to explain  the essence of art as a social phenomenon.
                                   The crisis of contemporary idealist aesthetics and its inability to understand and express in scientific terms the underlying laws of art, and  the trends discernible  in  modern development  came particularly clearly to the fore in the  thesis of the fundamental impossibility of any theoretical exposition of the nature  of art. According to Heidegger, rational , theoretically substantiated interpretation of artistic creativity, only testifies to the disintegration of creativity, for art, he held, could not be the subject of study and analysis. He regarded as an interesting phenomenon of history the fact that ages of great artistic achievement  had not been those in which aesthetic conceptions had been created: on the contrary, these had emerged only at times marked by artistic decline.
                             Malraux, suggest that the appearance of aesthetic theories, like all syn-
thesised attempts to define artistic practice and relate it to the process of man´s percep-
tion and apprehension of the world, are the result of the artificial and more often than not, harmful activity  of reason. He sees in theory some kind  of would-be organizing rational fantasies incompatible with the truly human world of irrational artistic creativity.  Both of them train of thought is utterly in keeping  with  their  existentialist world view. However, the similar  or closely  related  views are common enough in the conceptions of writers, whose work  is not directly linked with  the philosophy of irrationalism.


                            Voy a continuar en castellano esta huevada

In the very fact, this work was devoted to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the hero of my dreams in my youngest life in the Fine Art School.  However, the stubbornly truth pull me one more time in the quicksand of  philosophical confrontation, and the storm it was over my again.
                       Strictly,  Hegel I never leave him, because his dialectical system-ever green- is the source of  my knowledge, but the  struggle is  now and here. Don´t surprise if you find the noble profile of Hegel in my Coat-of Arms, when my truly weapon is the historical dialectical materialism.
                    This work represent the fruit of many years of deep thinking, with excessive caution in strangely circumstances. (at this time I was expelled and pursued from the  Communist Party; firs from the Soviet PC and later on the Chinese PC ) . I never resigned to the Engelianism-Leninist-Stalinist position. Under those problems and far off my country I began to write as an excuse to make up for my fall fight against counterrevolutionary forces.
                      I´ll write about aesthetics, that thing mistress present in all my life, some time as an angel or to  come  in a sight, but  ever an ladylove covered in rose-colored over gloomy optical-gray. She follow sleeping in my bed, and  with me ; I hope as far as the end.
            I should like to start this work, reporting the Aesthetics International Congresses along this century . There ,  we can find many raw material to  analice: his contribution, theoretical investigations and, overcoat: the contradictions and antagonisms between different ideological systems, specially nowadays, when illiteracy has been wiped out and publishing is done in the world on an unprecedented scale.
             We believe in the integral function of art and his role in the ideological  and moral education. Our manuscript are in this way, not only with  the Aesthetics Congresses but with  the exceedingly complex problems of the artistic creation.
 
               This work  is the evidence of our counter blow.
                The armies of the revolution is in force an victorious against the filthy traitors; but more over than this, we must to get ready  the new generations to enter in battle.
                Our front line is ideological in philosophy, aesthetics and art.
   
                Your health!   Comrades. . .


  Failure to grasp the dialectical interconnection between these two aspects quite frequently leads to  a distorted picture of progress in art or even denial that any such progress is taking place. Someone reduced the history of society to the history of art, by relying on the method  of living in the object and casting aside or disregarding objective law, causality. There are  still some special devil´s advocates of this approach. At the same time tendency is making itself increasingly felt, and that is the tendency to reduce art to life and treat the two as identical. At first sight these two approaches appear to contradict one another. But in fact they  are extreme which meet. Both o  them treat social existence and social consciousness, the object  and its artistic reflection, as identical this rise to all kinds of  subjectivity's theorizing about the `value definition of social  deveplopment´,with  the general conclusion  that everything depends  on the angle from which an object is viewed. As history  tells us, the assessment  of art  according  to the  categories  of progress and  regress becomes  particularly  important in the so-called transitional periods, which mark a turn  from social  formation to another. There is nothing  surprising in this, such periods  reveal the  conflict between  the new  productive forces  and the old production  relations, a conflict which, in he economy, goes on to exacerbate  all social contradictions. At such times the masses become more active in political life  and new social  forms are created, the  basis  of a new superstructure is laid  and social  development accelerates; of cost with a new reconditioning, rearranging  and revaluation  of the  material of art, in particular  his categories.
         As we now, the changes in the economic basis lead  sooner  or later to the  transformations of the whole immense superstructure . This transformation also embraces social consciousness, culture and art. A new understanding of the world arises, the class consciousness of social groups increases and a  new type of culture, including art, takes shape. A new system of aesthetic relationships replaces the old system and a fundamental reappraisal of values begins; new traditions linking present with past an future artistic development  come into  being and a new moral and aesthetic ideas are formulated, specially on socialist realism, whose dogmatic old principles it must pull down, and build  up a new one. What we have to bear in mind is that consciousness in all cases reflects changes taking place in the basis, but not always fully and  accurately; so the  transformation in economic relations may also be falsely expressed in aesthetics, in art.


         Nor can one unconditionally accept all the statements that have been made about previous epochs , about the art of time pats.  Materialism rightly remarked that enlightenment gave positive assessments only to  the aesthetic phenomena that conformed to their own ideas. He was not  citing an isolated  case. Assessments of the  aesthetic significance of the various epochs, not to mention  particular works of art, is a highly controversial subject.
 Ironically some theoretician put in, people discover themselves in the forebears and their progeny , they habitually judge the future and the past from the standpoint of their own time, by direct  analogy with the past, thus elevating  their own aesthetic ideas to the status of an absolute or eternal principle.  While stressing the unity of the general and the historical in social life and culture. It is not necessarily deny all standards in art. It rejects only metaphysical standards and models of ´eternal beauty´, which ignore the integral nature of the historical process and the diversity of ways in which general laws manifest themselves in life and culture. When the materialist philosopher wrote about the enduring significance of Greek art, he suggested that this was due to certain forms of social development without which Greek art would never have existed. They said: “ the charm their art has for us does not conflict with the immature stage of the society in which it originated. On the contrary its charm is a consequence of this and inseparably linked with the fact that the immature social conditions which gave rise, and which alone rise, and which alone could give rise, to this art cannot recur”. If ancient Greek art still retains its significance as an ideal, as an unattainable model, it is because this was where the historical childhood of humanity, manifested itself in its most beautiful forms, because ancient Greece experienced the fullest and most dynamic development of all social forms. The reason lies not in immaturity in general, but in the immaturity of antagonistic class contradictions, which were later to be so powerfully developed in feudal and particularly bourgeois society, moreover in all its spheres from the basis to the forms of social consciousness and art itself. Hegel was one of the firs to demonstrate the hostility of bourgeois society to art. He proved that the capitalist production was inimical to certain branches of intellectual production, e.g. art and poetry. Private System fetters the intellectual development of the working man and turns him an appendage of the machine; it condemns the bourgeois to spiritual poverty because the pursuit of profit tends to outweigh all his other feeling. Private System turns everything, including art, into a commodity. All the victories of art in bourgeois society –in prose, particularly in the novel, in painting, music and so on- are born of the struggle against the anti-aesthetic essence of bourgeois relations, against the omnipotence of money. This is why the `childhood` world of the ancients, where aim of production is to provide for human needs, reveals itself as something far more elevated than the capitalist world, where man´s aim is to produce and the aim of production is individual profit-making. 

The comparative significance of different historical epochs, and even whole social formations, for the artistic development of humanity depends on the degree to which the social relations of these epoch and formations disclose the human being, on whether they promote ( and if they do promote, to what degree) , the humane aspirations of art, on what part the people play in the creation of artistic culture, and to what extent its values belong to the people. These factors are bound to affect the comparative aesthetic value of artistic phenomena in different epochs and within the framework of each epoch, the various artistic trends, schools and individual artists, the character of art its ideological , aesthetic essence and its ability to understand the truth, and to know the essential needs of social development. The question of the relation between global historical progress and the progress of the individual society, both as whole and in its specific artistic development, is of great importance in sociology and the theory of art. In the masterpiece “ A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, Karl Marx says: “ An adult, cannot become a child again, or he becomes childish. But does the naïveté of the child not give him pleasure, and does not himself endeavour to reproduce the child´s veracity on a higher level? Does not the child in every epoch represent character of the period in its natural veracity? This analogy can help us to understand the essence of the question. Great works of art live eternally as unique creations of human genius. In science, the situation is different, where all previous discoveries are comprised, absorbed in the system of knowledge. With science there is no need to keep going back to its sources and foundations, to the achievements of previous epochs . And there is another important difference. Whereas scientists studying similar phenomena may arrive at exactly the same formulae and conclusions independently of one another, true art does not permit impersonality. What is more, the artistic image loses its concreteness and becomes a mere schema if the typical is presented as something abstractly general, divorced from the particular and the individual. When considering the development of art, one must not discount previous artistic experience. Maxim Gorky was perfectly right when he wrote , “nearly every book by a new author is intrinsically linked with works that have preceded it, and every new book there are elements of the old . It could not be otherwise because the process of the development of the intellect is a continuous line and all writers must obey the law of literary heredity. Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert and Maupassant would be impossible without one another. . .

” Every budding artist finds in the existing world of art certain level of material and spiritual culture, a certain amount of intellectual `material ´ which he cannot afford to ignore, certain ideas that people have had about the beautiful and the ugly, certain artistic tastes, without fully understanding what they were. And most people would acknowledge that clearly expressed artistic tastes in society, the capability for emotional cognition and experience of the beautiful in nature, in society and works of art cannot fail to influence the development and formation of art as a whole. That is no less true when the artist breaks through the barrier of traditional forms of artistic thinking and aesthetic perception than when he follows them, at least unconsciously. The auditorium for art, the ability to respond aesthetically the possession of artistic taste are shaped by the whole life of society, all social conditions, and not only by artistic creativity, not only by art. In other words the practice of art, people´s ideological and aesthetic development, although specific in their aims, character and forms, are always connected with all other forms of human practice, with all aspects of the life of society. Politics, philosophy and morality in art cannot be regarded as something outside aesthetics, as the theoreticians who seek to divorce art from progressive political and philosophical ideas in art acquire a specific , aesthetic significance to the extent that they are wowed into the artistic fabric of work of art after passing through the crucible of the individual´s aesthetics consciousness, his emotional sphere. Every budding artist finds in the existing world of art a certain level of material and spiritual culture, a certain amount of intellectual material which he cannot afford to ignore, certain ideas that people have had about the beautiful and ugly, certain artistic tastes, without fully understanding what they were. And most people would acknowledge that clearly expressed artistic tastes in society, the capability for emotional cognition and experience of the beautiful in nature, in society and in works of art cannot fail to influence the development and formation of at as whole. That is no less true when the artist breaks through the barrier of traditional forms of artistic thinking and aesthetic perception than when he follows them, at least unconsciously. The auditorium for art, the ability to respond aesthetically the possession of artistic taste are shaped by the whole life of society, all social conditions, and not only by artistic creativity, not only by art. In other words, the practice of art, people´s ideological and aesthetic development, although specific in their aims, character and forms, are always connected with all other forms of human practice, with all aspects of the life of society. Politics, philosophy and morality in art cannot be regarded as something outside aesthetics, as the theoreticians who seek to diverse art from progressive political, moral and philosophical ideas maintain. On the contrary, moral, political and philosophical ideas in art acquire a specific, aesthetic significance to the extent that they are wowed into the artistic fabric of a work of art after passing through the crucible of the individual´s aesthetic consciousness, this emotional sphere. This means that art is connected with life, with its social patterns not only directly but also through other forms of social consciousness, which, incidentally, are bound to leave their imprint on all aesthetic values created by the people and by gifted artists.

 
In the course of historical development the links between morality and philosophy are perfected and deepened, thus enriching people´s intellectual word and their practical activity.
There are also, of course, form of social consciousness that hinder the development of artistic thought. Religion, for example, tries to steer art towards the celestial heights and deprive it of its vital earthly content. Of course, it is impossible to donny the link between art and religion in the early stages of human society. With the forces of production at such a low level nobody could make a sober appraisal of the world without any extraneous influences. But it would also be wrong to identify the religious and artistic assimilation of reality. Religion always grows out of nonknowledge, while art develops on the basis of knowledge, it perfects itself as knowledge of the objective world grows more profound. If we consider the history of art, we have no difficulty in perceiving the striking differences, for example, between the religious myth, the fairy-tale and the folk tale in the period of the disintegration of the tribal system. It is harder to distinguish between the fairy-tale and the myth as the earlier stages of cultural development because at that time every generalization was clothed in mythological form. But even this does not prove any close connection between the artistic and religious assimilation of reality, because mythology with its primitive syncretism amalgam of ideas arose not out of mysticism, but out of a primitive, naïve urge to explain reality. Mythology helped to developed art in the ancient world to the extent that legends and myths were artistic generalizations, free of the dogmatic elements characteristic of religion. While there can no doubt that European artistic culture in the Middle Ages developed under the influence of Christianity, and that the adoption of Christianity in Russia was a progressive phenomenon, it is clear that the development of artistic creativity in these cases was promoted not by religion itself, but by the cultural influences that came with the Christian religion. As for religious dogmatism and asceticism, they did nothing but hinder the flowering of artistic creativity.
 
When religion often assumed the garb of art in an effort to put art at its service, mysticism never swallowed up art even in the Middle Ages. Although the rhyms, the psalms, the visions and other forms of the medieval art were originally connected with religion, they nevertheless drew extensively on folklore, in which pre-Christian notions abounded. The popular epos, the lyrics and novels of chivalry, civic architecture, and many forms of applied arts also existed independently in the Middle Ages. Social Realism, as a great art which truly reflects life, does not, of course, reject fantasy and imagination. It is never a mechanical reproduction of certain facts of life. It is always a generalization of life´s phenomena and is, therefore, not averse to intensifying the image, to using symbols and grotesque, if any of these things help to achieve an authentic artistic reproduction of reality. The form of the artistic image may also be based on convention or fantasy, but one thing is indispensable under all circumstances: the bias of artistic truth is knowledge of the truth of life in its essential connections and relationships. And unless we are deeply prejudiced, we have no difficulty in realizing this when considering the history of art. Social Realism is in the gradual process of self-liberation from the impediments that distort the true picture of the objective world. By liberating itself art is able to reveal man´s spiritual world more deeply and fully, thus reinforcing man´s confidence in his creative powers. On the others side, the advocates of unrestricted realism or abstract realism, which is the same thing, force the whole history of artistic creativity right up to the 20th century into a narrow framework of naturalism, which they call illusionism. They ascribe the supreme role in the development of artistic illusionism to Balzac and claim that the art of the 20th century has been dominated by those who, having overcome illusionism, have created works of art entirely on the basis of their own fecund imaginations, arbitrarily, by sheer intuition, deliberately deforming lifelike ideas and trying to banish all visible signs of life from art. This they call ascending to the heights of realism; in the past artists tried to imitate life, but now art, so they maintain, must create its own specific reality as the artist himself thinks fit. Such theoreticians believe that artistic principle, art´s creative method spring not from the reflection of reality but from the capricious imagination of the artist, who has managed to get away from reality. They make no distinction between realist conventions and those that drag the artist away from reality and turn his work into a whimsical intellectual game. The true history of art is bound to be distorted if artistic creativity is understood in this way. Religion, on the other hand, but in the same side, like any other kind of irrationality trend in art, hinders the artistic cognition of reality and prevents us from showing the movement of the masses towards freedom in all its beauty and fullness, prevents us from understanding and explaining life, the new phenomena that arise and grow stronger in life. The under healthy growths on the living tree of artistic knowledge, once they have appeared, form their own traditions. In its development art breaks the bonds is such traditions, which impede artistic understanding of the objective world. But art does not break all traditions. It carefully assimilates what has been accumulated by previous artistic development and what may help to bring about new artistic discoveries, and then marches forward on the basis of this artistic experience, enriching the classical traditions and creating new art forms.
 
 
New social phenomena and themes present the artist with new problems in the sphere of form. In the classical period of Greek art the heroic epic, wish had been the dominating genre, was superseded by the drama. His signaled a transition from collective creativity to literature and overcome the static and descriptive element in the epic by concentrating event in completed actions and bringing them together around the main conflict. The drama emerges as a new type of artistic phenomenon with its own genre and stylistic-compositional form. We see how later the drama on the one hand, increasingly from departs from ritual action -ancient Greece- and begins to draw its material not from ritual but from narrative prose, while still under all circumstances retaining its spectacular character - Middle Ages-, until at last it enters the sphere of literature. On the other hand, in the drama the form in which the dramatize conflict emerges gradually changes: in ancient Greece the dramatic action was propelled by Fate; during the Renaissance. Tima appeared on the scene with its historical perception of events; in the 17th century the drama paid more and more attention to the human soul; in the 18th century the theatre of the Enlightenment was dominated by middleclass drama, portraying manners, the life of the third state (properly speaking, in the modern sense of the term, drama dates from the Enlightenment when the sharp divisions between tragedy and comedy were comedy were eliminated). This perfecting of the artistic form of cognition of reality is one of the characteristic features of the progressive development of artistic form of cognition of reality is one of the characteristic features of the progressive development of artistic culture, in the course of which both the creative method and the techniques, the means by which material is processed by the artist, are improved and perfected. The possibilities for the artistic portrayal of the reality, if we have in mind the line of human artistic development, are thus deepened an expanded. At the end , art cannot stand still for yet another reasons, the reason is that in the process of the cultural growth of society aesthetic feelings and artistic tastes are developed, that is to say, the whole people which is the subject of art, grows aesthetically, and acquires a richer intellectual world and consciousness. This is an essential prerequisite and the same time a result of historical progress in art. In short, the scope of artistic cognition of reality expands from one epoch to another and popular participation in the development of art, the significance of artistic culture in the life of society, increase. In the curse of history there have been more or less favorable and sometimes totally unfavorable conditions for the development of art and aesthetic educations, but there have been no total gasps in its development. Artistic thought has never dried completely

 



Even in the Midddle Ages, which to the Enlighteners of the 18ht century seemed to be a time of total barbarity and ignominy, artistic deveplopment did not stop but brought fresh discoveries and advances. Suffice it to recall the Gothic cathedrals oof Reims and Chatrer, Amiens and Paris, the famous frescoes and cultural decorations, particularly in churches; themusica mensurata, and other rudiments of the new musical culturer, and also the burgher literature, which from the 13th century in Western Europe became the main line of artistic development. In the Middle Ages link with previous development, particulary with the culture of the ancients, was not severed. Augustine(later on:Saint)did not reject everything that had been created in classical times and his follower. Abélard thought higly of Ovid and Horace. Artist learned from antiquity, even if they did it in a medieval way. Antiquity was studied and some of its elements were developed by the progressive artist of Middle Ages, who blazed the trail for the art of the Renaissance. The objective, historically logical connection between the various stages in the development of art is not in doubt. But what kind of connection was it?. Only the dialectical antagonic connection. These differences of opinion mentioned above are reflected first and foremost in two diametrically opposed points of departure, of cost unreconcilable. According to the one, aesthetics constitutes a science concerned solely with the laws of artistic development and the nature of artistic creativity. Viewed from that angle, aesthetics is no more than the general theory of art. Those approach it from the other angle, proffer the view that aesthetics and the general theory of art are separate sciencies. It is precisely the theory of art which is concerned with the laws of artistic development and the nature of artistic creativity, while aesthetic, they assure us, is just a science of the beautiful, both in the real world and in art.
Clearly neither of these aproaches is acceptable, since they are both one-side. Aesthetic is concerned both with the study of the beutiful in all its manifold forms and also with the elucidation of the nature of art and the laws of its development. A consistent phylosophy aesthetics serves to summarise the laws governing man´s aesthetic perception of the world. However, given that these laws find their fullest, most comprhensive and direct expression in art, so aesthetics constitutes firs and foremost a science of essence and fundamental laws of art, of the nature of artistic creativity. Thus the significance of this consistent aessthetics, which scientifically substantiates the experience involved in th emost diverse manifestations of aethetic perception, is determined by the role which it plays in the development of art.
It is this principle which has gained particulary wide recognition. Its adherents, logically enough, start out from the fact man´s aesthetic perception of the real world is a brosder sphere of activity than art itself. It invoves not only artistic creativity but also other manifestations of man´s aesthetic relationship with reality. Yet at the same time it presupposes a farreaching and active influence exerted by art on various spheres of material and cultural life, the participation of art in the process of transforming the real world. This is why literature and art have always been the main subjects of aesthetic study throughout its story, and it is no coincidence that the fundamental and most important premises of this consistent aesthetics have taken shape above all on the basis of generalisations drawn from artistic experience. Theoretical interpretation of creative work in the field of modern art and deliberate influence upon its development is the most important task of aesthetics now as before.

The art is a part of the subject of aesthetics occupies pride of place and not only on the strength of its sheer volume. To a large extent art determines the very character of aesthetic research as a whole. This explains why the majority of aesthetic theories to date have resembled art criticism. The theory of art has thus provided and provides the most satisfactory and comprenhensive model om which to base parameters for other phenomena coming the heading of aesthetics. The subject of aesthetics now covers wider ground, but " parameters for other phenomena" that come within its range are, at the present time, still determined by art as such. On the opposite side, who hold that there is a sharply defined boundary between the general theory of art and aesthetics, the study of the beautiful, suggest that their standpoint is based on Chernyshevsky´s point of view and is diametrically opposed to the basic tenets of Hegelian aesthetics. At the same time they stress that Hegel in is Ästhetik´s lessons started out from the view that the said science is a theory of art, to be more precise, a theory of fine art, while Chernyshevsky used two separate concepts: `aesthetics´ and the `theory of art´. However, it would seem that the Russian aesthetician did not in any way consider these concepts to represent two separate sciencies. He asked: ´What is to be understood by aesthetics if not a system of general principles for art as such, and poetry in particular?. It is clear that Chernyshevsky, like Hegel before him, as he worked towards a definition of the subject of aesthetic, maitained that is shold be defined first and foremosst as a general theory of art. The fact that Chernyshevsky appeared to distinguish between aesthetics and criticism did not constitute any fundamental difference between the conceptions of the two writers; what set Chernyshevsky´s ideas apar from those of Hegel was the former´s materialist interpretation of the nature of aesthetics and artistic creativity and the social role of art. It thus follows that Chernyshevsky cannot be ranked among those writers who regard aesthetics and the theory of art separate entities. Precise definition and enrichment of our concepts of the subject of aesthetics are essential for its continued deveplopment. Debates in recent years has centred round the concluding stage of work aimed to single out aesthetics as a separate branch of scientific knowledge. Controversy has centred, in particular, arround such problemss as the relationship between aesthetics and the history of art, and between aesthetics and philosophy, inthe bosom of wich it has traditionally developed, however, this broadening of modern concepts of aesthetics does not in the least imply that all phenomena of the real worl should be extended to the utmost in view of the aesthetician´s capacity to provide an aesthetic evaluation of any phenomenon. Yet at the same time its range should not be excessively narrowed down by the omission from aesthetic studies of art in the broad sense of the world. An example of this narrowing, and hence impoverishment, of the subject of aesthetics can be found in a very special theory, where categorical distictions are between the aesthetic and the artistic, thus excluding the general theory of art from the field of aesthetics...


We´ll open a brief parentheses when among the problems arising when procwsses of consciousness and understanding are invetigated those that lead to paradoxical situations deserve special attention, videlicet, to the impossibility of overcoming logical contradictions that stem from the simplest, most obvious premises. These problems include the link between sensual and rational aspects of understanding. Philosophers, from the classic Greeks have been investigating the difference between the mentally comprehended - noumenon- and what is comprehended by sensations-phenomenon-, a difference they reduce to opposition. Classical philosophy drew a more or less clear line between these sesations (as emotions or feelings), and reason(ideas, abstractions, judgments). But difficulties arose when explaining the connection between these two aspects of cognitive activity which led to the formation of rival conceptions that found expression in a centuries-longconfrontation of sensationism and ratonalism. Discussion developed, in particular, on the souce of the knowledge that every individual person and humankind as a whole disposed of. The theory before mentined holds that research into specific features of art and study of the nature of creativity -as opposed to paticular theories of art- should be the province of a separae science, a "general theory of art". This assumtion need not be called in question. However this theory goes on to suggest that the theoretical study of the history of art, that has constituted a separate science since the time of Hegel, is wrongly termed aesthetics:"During the last 150 years, indeed right up to the present time, the general theoretical study of the history of art has often been labelled ´aesthetics´, which gives rise to impermissible confusion of quite distinct branches of knowledge". Yet if esthetics is taken separately from the general theory of art, then what will its suject be? In answer to this question on suggest thet the definition of the subject of aesthetics provided by Baumgarten be used: in the later´s view aesthetics was the study of "knowledge through sensation" that helps man to understand the beauty of the world around him. Aesthetics, as we see, is the science of the objective properties of the "beutiful", of the correlation between the beautiful and other analoguos properties of phenomena in the real world, and of man´s apprehension of theses properties. However, the weakness of this view comes clearly to the fore in the final in the final conclusion: although aesthetics has its own specific subject-matter, this subject-matter does not possess any inner laws of its own. Yet, without the latter, can aesthetics possess specific subjectt-matter, and its essence be singled out and defined? For indeed, the right to an independent existence of any any science rest and foremost on whether or not there are specific inner laws peculiar to the subject under study. In fact, the conception considered above there is however a certain degree of retional content to be discerned. They reflect the tremendous significance of the aesthetic principle in various forms of the practical graps of the real world in modern advanced society. In a society concern for the future, the aesthetic principle acquires incomparably greater significance than it ever had in the past. At the present time central topics aesthetics become new have come to include forms of aesthetics activity that have recently undergone intensive development, topics which extend beyond the cconfines of artistic creativity. These include technical design, aesthetic qualityy of man´s enviroment, and certain other manifestation of aesthetic principle, such as sport. These forms of aesthetic activity cannot be contained within art cateories and require a different explanation. Undeniably all these types of activity constitute, together with art, a single aesthetic culture and should not be viewed as something divorced from art. They are qualitatively different from each other, yet at the same time have much in comon. There is no doubt that art can be regarded as a school for all forms aesthetic activity.


The historical movility and flexibility of subjects of scientific sudy characterise the evolution of scientific knowledge and philosophy. This applies not only to the structure but to the very substance of subjects under study. Changes in the structure of the science of aesthetics are shaped by the objective historical development of the phenomena studied by aestheticians, in particularthe features and trends peculiar to the development of contemporary art. Changes in the substance of the subject-matter of aesthetics are determined bothh by the objective process of the emerge of new types of aesthetic activity(such as design), new art forms (photograph, cinema and televition), and by changes in the objectives and problems facing the aestheticians. It is therefore meaningless to seek for hard and fast or conclusive definitions of the subject of aesthetics: they should be to certain extent approximate and open to amendments and modifications. On the other hand, the fact that the subject-matter of aesthetics involves, as indeed to definitions of aesthetics, does not justify any attemps to conclude that relevant definitions of aesthetics are altogether impossibl, as is the practice for example among adherents of "analytical aesthetics".  The study of aesthetic theory runs into various difficulties of methodological and world-view character, suffice it to mention that both in recent years, and before that, almost all works on problems of scientific theory relied on the factual materials of natural sciencies, in the first place of physics. It is possible to concentrate here on the development of sciencies, where their theoretical organisation is represented most clearly. It turned out, however, that "clarity" had its drawbacks, too. By no means all propositions that are applicable to the theories of natural science are applicable in the analysis of the theoretical forms of thinking employed in the social sciences, the humanities, art criticism and, finally, aesthetics. The specificity of forms of thinking, including, first and foremost, theoretical thinking, both in the natural and man sciences has to be taken into account. It becomes increasingly clear that the specificity of man´s aesthetic relation to the to the worls, in the framework of wich is truly human transformation is aschieved, aesthetic cognition at each stage of its development concenttrated on the fundamental problems of humans being, however distractive they might look in the mirror of theoretical thiking. Hence the special forms of interaction and the specificity of synthesising various branches of knowledge in theoretical aesthetics and in aesthetic science as a whole. Turning to the concrete universal tendencies in the deveplopment of aesthetic theory, we must admit that its highest forms in the ahead of time were schieved by classical German philosophy, and in this context, by Hegelian aesthetics as the most profund and systematically alaborated form of theoretical aesthetical aesthetics. hegel´s aesthetic system, being differentiated whole, represents not only a kind of scientific norm of this aerlier period of the development of philosophical aesthic, it also reveals, in striking relief, its links with the previous stages in the development of theoretical aesthetics. Hegelian aesthetics demostrates, to a great extent if not fully, the internal reversibility of the historical and the logical, which is intensified, among other reasons, by the links between the theoretical system and the history of the formation and development of theoretical thought. Absorbing the content of the previous stages in the development of theoretical though. Absorbing the content of the previous stages in the development of cognition.

Hegelian aesthetics appears, not only in the logical but just as much in the historical sense, as a kind of invariant form of the cognitive relation in theoretical aesthetics. This stand out with the utmost clarity if we take into account that we are dealing here with Hegel´s construction and transformation os thesse aspcts of scientific activity which were oriented toward desinging idealised objects, working out the rules for operating with them, and developing a system of interpretation of these idealisations. This orientation of Hegel´s aesthetics permitted him to sublate more fully the achievements of materialist aesthetic thought as well-as was poited out by Engels. We turned to this question in connection with the special position of methodological problems of historical-retrospective studies in scientific knowledge. Its complexity and links with the present-day state of science have been pointed out on several occasions recently. Taking into account the special character of relative independence of the theoretical forms of cognition, this question must, in our view, be substantively reformulated. We are interested here not only in the links between the Hegelian, or most advanced form of aesthetic science, and the previous forms of theoretical thinking but also in the post-Hegelian qualitative transformation of aesthetics as a whole, and primarily of its theoretical system, effected by Marxism. To establish this continuity in the domain of aesthetic cognition is alll the more topical since we are concerned with thinking in the sphere of idealisation, with transformation and systematisations that have no direct bearing on the world of objective phenomena and processes. It is this position, however , that calls for a methodological analys of continuity in aesthetic science considered in the light of diverse, qualitatively different elements of its movement. Of cost this last point needs a consequent exposition. The view of aesthetic theory as a differentiated whole compels us to divide our attention between two aspects of this phenomenon: first, the morphological definiteness of the links and relations of this differentiated whole, and second, the movement of its historical definiteness. This interpretation, based on the dialectical materialism of unity of the historical and logical, makes it possible to identify a number of stages in the development of cognition in aesthetic theory with regard to different parameters which are, however, equaly essential for the theoretical world, such features of theoretical aesthetic knowledge can be singled out, among athers, as ita completeness and intergrality, its links with the theories of contiguous an othehr branches of knowledge of different orders or levels, the structure of substantiation of the theoretical forms at different stages of development, the leading contradictions of the principal tendencies of this development, etc. Still, the determinig factor of any theoretical system is the relation between theory and object, i.e., the domain wich the system has to explain and in relation to wich it must become a link in the chain of its transformation.


The process of identification of the object in the object enviroment, and subsequent narrowing down of the object to the limits of the subject-matter under study (which is a cross-section of the object), is sublated by the theory in its activity of creating a special theoretical world -the world of ideal objects, which represents never less not only the links and relations of the subject matter of research but also the interconnection between the subject-matter and the object of study. The complexity of relationship between theoretical objects(or objects created theoretically) and the objects of the real world, on the hand, and the need for establishing this relationship, on the other, pose before theory the problem of reflexion, wich constitute to a large extent the content of the relation of a theory to its object. Simulstaneously, and precisely in view of the above, theoretical reflexion figures as an indicator of the degree of naurity of the theory itself. The links between theoretical reflextion and the above-mentioned and other parameters of the movement of theoretical-aesthetic cognition as a whole, and withe each of them in particular, are obvious, but the measure of the reflexiveness of a theory at different moments of its evolution, contained in its structural componets, varies. In other world , an aesthetic theory, which is structurally a system of theories, is not uniform on the content plane in relation to its theoretical object, and undoubtedly affects its explanatory possibilities in relation to the object at the cognition of which it is oriented. Even ,preliminary analysis shows that aesthetic theory laying claims to a certain completenss of theoretical descriptions and explanations of its object includes theories of artistic creativity an aesthetic perception, the theory of art, theories artistic and work of art, the theory of artistic upbringing, etc. The content of the theory represented in this way is linked not only with the way theoretical-aesthetic system is organised (the principles, foundations, etc., of this organisation), but also with extent in wich this system has been reflexiively elaborated in terms of the same (or differnt) theory. Reflexion in terms of a differnt theory is by no means of rare occasion in the history of aesthetics. Wich some reservations it may be asserted that the history of aesthetics is in this sense a gradual theoretical emancipation of the aesthetic-cognitive reflexive principle of which the meaning consisted (and still consist in many present day constructs in theoretical aesthetic) in transposing these basic principles (of a general philosophical, epistemological, and often of a particular scientific nature) from the outside into the interior, so to speak, i.e., in their philosophical aesthetic assimilation and absorption, in this connection, the inner relationship between aesthetic theory and the theries of contiguous or related branches of knowledge should be pointed out. In the first place, there are theoretical doctrines whish directly adjoin aesthetic theory and largely condition it: the theory of personality, the theory of creativity, the theory of culture, the theries of laguage and representational activity, etc.


The reflexive ability of theoretical-aesthetic cognition can be typologically represented in accordance with the degree of realisation of the links between aesthetic theory and the theories of contiguous spheres, the forms of the assimilations of their content, the completeness and correctness of absorption of this content. However, much deeper and more decisive links are discovered in the process of analysis of the structural organisation of aesthetic theory when we consider the relation of system-formation in terms of its philosophical methodological conditioning and reflexivity is highly relative, the latter being included in the former, naturally with due regard for the historical possibility in relation to completeness as well as the character of this inclusion. Still, the opposition does exist. We have to distinguish in the methodology of cognition the fully conscious and purposive realisation in the process of cognition of a definite system of methods, modes and forms of simulation of the subject-matter from the aspect which is characterised by an incomplete, not fully or inadequately realised cognitive action. In scientific methodology this distinction is of a basically different character, but it is vital here as well. Its essence is in the lack of coincidence between the inner objective content of human activity as a whole and of cognition as a a process which ensures it, in particular, works its way through the network of events and normal actions as their leitmotif which reaches consciousness and realisation only when the field of vision encompasses a temporally sufficiently extended of events whose variability makes the inner links, recurrence, rhythm and orientation more vulnerable. The methodological level of the content of activity aimed at a maximal narrowing down of this gap (between the objective content of activity, including cognitive activity, and its realised content) cannot escape the common lot, and under some conditions, both cognitive and socio-cultural, this gap in the methodology itself proves to be significant. Under these conditions, theoretical constructs-both separate conceptions and theoretical systems- turn to such a fundamental scientific structure as the picture of the world.
What are the specific cognitive and socio cultural conditions which compel theoretical thinking to orient itself not only at a definite methodology which has established itself as the most effective in scientific cognition but also at the picture of the world, which retaining its ontological status, turns out to be an effective form of a cognition with a sufficiently productive organising and ordering sense forming functions? In the history of aesthetic science, these conditions manifest themselves at the periods characterised by violation of the symmetry of methodology as regards its sublation of the content of natural and social sciences. This historically universal state appears in a concrete universal form, as far as philosophical aesthetic methodology is concerned, during transitional periods when one stable cognitive culturological paradigm replaces another. We here to the transiton from to medieval culture, from medieval to the Modern, etc.

These  are  periods  when  the  role  of  aesthetics as  methodology becomes  especially vital.  The  periods  of  normal  development  of  aesthetics  science  are  marked  by  coincidence  of  theory  and  its  methodological  content,  while  in  transitional  periods  the   ever  present  contradictions  grow  more  acute,  the  fact  that aesthetics  methodology is  a meaningfully  richer  system  than its theoretical make-up stands  out  specially  clearly. However, in this situations, too, theoretical aesthetics  cognition, retaining relative independence and being addressed  to the  world  of idealized objects, does not  endeavour to sublate this  contradictions by methods suggested by aesthetics methodology, looking instead, for  the organizing principle, to the  pictures of  the world´s  considered in its most general form.  The fruitfulness of  this orientation of theoretical thinking  is  apparent: the philosophical picture  of  the  world  activates, through  the   mediation  of theory,  the  development of aesthetic methodology, stimulating  the  methodological elaboration  of  the   most contradictory cognitive  problems  in the  field  of  aesthetic assimilation.  This cognitive  situation is characteristic  not  only  of  aesthetics.  At  definite periods,  physical theory, too,  searches  for  the  organizing principle  in the  picture  of  the world.  Significantly, the  purpose  of  these  endeavour consist in going beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  physical  picture  of the world  proper in order to reconstruct  it  from  the  positions of  deeper links and relations  of  the  natural  scientific  picture  of the  world. This  reconstruction  has  not  always been implemented  explicitly.  The  natural scientific picture  of the  world  is  present  in the  constructs  of  the  theoretical physics  as  an  implicit  assumption. But  a  fundamental  revision  of  the  paradigm  of theoretical physics  is  impossible without resorting to  the philosophical picture of the  world, as demonstrated  by the  work of  Einstein and  other scientist, who have  done  a  great  deal  towards qualitative  revision of  the  theoretical world  in  their  branches  of science.  Characteristically, scientists of  this  order  did  not  only turn to  the  general philosophical world view foundations  but  also  relied  on their  aesthetic  conceptions  of  the  world. Symptomatically,  during the  last  transition  from  the  Renaissance culture  to  the  ideas  of  the  Modern Times  the  natural  scientific picture  of  the  world  was  sharply  divided  from  the  aesthetic notion of it. The general philosophical world picture was  entirely  constructed   on natural scientific knowledge  which, up  to  the  end  of the 19th century,  was not very distinctly formalized  in  character.  As  the scientific apparatus  of  natural science  was  further formalized and mathematised,  the  particular  sciences displayed  increased interest  in philosophical knowledge and,  in  particular,  in the philosophical world  picture  as  a  fundamental  meaningful assumption  and cognitive  form. It  becomes  clear, however,  that the  picture  of  the world  constructed  entirely  of  natural  scientific knowledge  does  not  possess  the  universality and  completeness  necessary for  creative  assimilation. On  the  general plane,  it  becomes clear  why  creatively  thinking  theoreticians of natural sciences turn  to the  artistic  aesthetic picture  of  reality, it  should  be   noted  from  the  outset  that  the  artistic aesthetic  picture  of  the  world, unlike  the  natural  scientific  one, and  at  the  philosophical one, has  developed  over  centuries,  beginning  with  antiquity, without  opposing its  content  to the content  of  science  but  subletting  the  latter  and  transforming  it  into  the  forms  of  artistic aesthetic conceptions.

The universality and completeness of  these  forms  permits  the  employment  of  the artistic picture  of  the  world  not  only  as  a  fundamental assumption  in the  process  of  developing  fundamentally new  theoretical  constructions  in  the  humanities  but  also  as  an  effective  form, both types  of employment  of  the  artistic  picture  of  the  world  have  been  noted  as  vital for  theoreticians  of  natural  science  as  well,  which was  pointed  out  above from  a  slightly  different  angle. In a  process  as complicated  as  cognitive  activity  there  is  a  host  of premises,  preconditions, transitions,  and  the  moments  that  play a role of sort  in achieving  the  results  of   knowledge. Some of  them  are  obligatory < in the  sense  that their  absence  makes  the  very  process  of  knowledge impossible>; others have  a  more  or  less  chance  character.  To  avoid  differences  in the  interpretation  of  term signifying  one  moment of the  process  of  knowledge or another,  we shall  touch  on  some  definitions  related  to  our  theme  so  as to reduce the  risk  of  a  different  understanding of  the  text  as  far  as possible. The  obligatory  premises  include  the  existence  of  a  subject  of  knowledge, i.e. of  someone who performs  cognitive  activity,  and  the  existence  of  an object of knowledge, i.e. of  something to  which  the  subject´s activity  is  directed.  Sometimes the subject>matter  of knowledge  is  singled  out  from the object  of knowledge, i.e. the  aspect < property, relation > of   the object  that   is included  in the  given cognitive process from a  definite standpoint,  according  to the  aims  and  interest  of  knowing  subject.  Man  as  an integrated object  of  knowledge,  for  example, figures in various qualities  as the  subject>matter of  knowledge,  for  example, figures  in  various  qualities  as  the  subject>matter  of  knowledge  in  sociology,  physiology, psychology, ethics, etc.
The  subject>matter  of  knowledge  can  be  either  objects  of  the  environment  counterposes  to  the   subject  in  the  form  of  the  world  around  him,  or  the  subject  of knowledge  himself,  as  happens  in the  self>knowledge.  It  is  necessary to  remember, too,  that  the  term  subject>matter < cobject > is  used  not  only  in the  sense  of  subject>matter   of  knowledge,  but  also  to  mean  to mean a  part  of  the  objective  world  with  a  relatively  independent  existence, i.e. with  a  meaning  identical  or  close  to  the  concept  thing.  The  sense  of  the  term  can be  established from  the  context in  which  it  occurs. By cognitive  activity  we  understand  primarily the process through which the  peculiarities  of  the  object of knowledge  are reflected in the  consciousness of  the  subject  with some degree  of  reliability.  The  result  is the  aggregate  or  totality  of  the knowledge  or  information, in short  data  the  subject  has  about  the object  of  knowledge.  The  subject´s  experience  of  his  relations  with  the  external  world  and   himself  in the  form  either  of  satisfaction  or  of dissatisfaction constitutes  the  sphere  of emotions.   Apart from  the  subject>object relation, the  necessary  conditions of  the   cognitive  process  include  the  existence  of  channels  in  the  subject  by  which he  receives  information  about  the  object  of  knowledge, and  also  the  existence  of  a  capacity  in  the   subject  to  retain and  process  this  information according  to  certain rules. The  moments  listed   above  do  not  exhaust  all  premises  and  conditions that make  cognitive  activity  possible  but  we  can  limit  ourselves  to  them  at  the  beginning  of  our exposition since  their existence  is  sufficient  for  a review  of  the  initial  premises  that  have  led  since  antiquity, it would  seem,  to  unresolvable  contradictions in explanation  of  the nature of knowledge.  Several  of  these  contradictions  were  linked  with the  difference between, and opposition of, the  two  aspect < degrees> of  knowledge, i.e., sensory  and  rational.  In  order  to  designate  these  two  aspect, moreover, various writers use  different terms.  The  sensory  aspect, for  instance, is  sometimes called  sense  experience,  sensibility, sensibilia, etc. The  rational aspect is  called  abstract, logical, rational, or  conceptual thinking, intellect, etc.
 
In spite  of  the  host  of  terms < which  itself  is  indirect  evidence  of  the  complexity  and  many  sidedness  of  these  two  aspects  of  cognitive  activity  and  their  relations>  a quite  definite  line  can  be  drawn  between them, for  all  that,  which  indicates  their  qualitative  difference. Sensory knowledge  most  often  includes  sensations, perceptions, and  representations < notions >. By  sensations, we  understand  the  elementary psychic phenomena  that  arise  through  the  direct  effect of  objects  on  the  subject´s sense  organs  and are  experienced  by  the  latter  as qualities inherent  in the objects themselves.
Sensations underlie  perceptions, i.e.  the  direct  sensory  reflection  of  reality in the  form  of  integral  sensory  images.  The  object  of  knowledge  figures  in  the  perception  of   objects as something’s independent < e. g.  a  lemon as  a unity  of  sensations of  yellow,  roundness, etc.>. Finally, a  representation  is  a  sensory>visual  image  that  is  preserved  and  reproduced  by  the  subject  without  direct  action  of  the  object  on  his  sense  organs. < We  can  observe  the  fruit  here  and  now >. Many  attempts  have  been  made  in  accordance  with  the  initial  formula  of  sensationism  to  explain  the  transition  from  the  isolated  data  of  sense  experience  to  general  concepts  by  their  mechanical  uniting  and  transformation. They failed,  througt they  had  a  positive  significance  in their day. The thesis  of  the  formation of  concepts  from  an  aggregate  of  sense>perceived data, taken  into  the  arsenal  of  metaphysical materialism,  in particular, played  a  positive  role  in  the  fight  against  idealist  speculations  about  the  supernatural  origin  of  rational  knowledge.  The  origin  of  conceptual  thinking  was  not  due  to  the  intervention  of  a supernatural force  but  came  from  the   development  of  sense  knowledge  itself. Spokesmen of  sensationism  who  took  a  materialist  position  started  from notions  that  the  sensory  image   was  an  ideal < copy> of  objects  existing  outside  consciousness.  But  the   limitation  inherent  in  the  metaphysical method  did  not  allow  of  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  relationship  of  sensation   and  reason. In  particular  a  satisfactory  answer  was  not  obtained  to  the  question  of  the question  of the  character  of  the  transition  of  the  quantitative accumulation  of  the  isolated   data  of  sense  experience  into  a  new  quality   of commonness proper  to  conceptual  thinking.

 
The  term  of  METAPHYSICS has  a  long  and  complicate  story.  It  came  into  usage  in  the  1 st century B.C. To  denote  part  of  the  philosophical heritage  of  Aristotle.  He  called this  most  important part  of  his  philosophical doctrine  the < Firs Philosophy >, that  which  studies the < highest > principles  of  all that exist,  which are  inaccessible  to the  senses,  comprehensible  only  to  speculative  reason,  and  indispensable  for  all  sciences. In  this  sense  the  term  METAPHYSICS was current  in  subsequent  philosophy.  In the  Middle Ages  METAPHYSICS  was  used to  substantiate  theology  philosophically.  Approximately  from  the  16th  century  on  the  term of METAPHYSICS was  used  in  the  same  sense  as the   term < ontology >.  With Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza  and other  philosophers  of the 17th century, METAPHYSICS was still closely connected with the natural and humanitarian sciences. This connection was broken in the 18th century, particularly in the ontology of Chrian von Wolff. This term is now widely used in philosophy. In the period of modern history there arose the understanding as an anti>dialectical method of thinking, owing to its one-sidedness in cognition, it regard things and phenomena as immutable and independent of one another; denies that intrinsic contradictions are the source of development in nature and society. Historically, this was explained by the fact that in ancient times and during the renaissance scientific and philosophical knowledge regarded nature as a whole, in motion and development; subsequently, due to the deepening and differentiation of scientific knowledge, the latter divided nature into a number of isolated spheres, being investigated outside the connection with one another. Hegel was the first to use the term in its anti>dialectical sense. While generalizing the data of science and social progress, Marx and Frederick Engels demonstrated the bankruptcy of metaphysical thinking and counterpoised to it the method of materialist dialectics. For us, in the 20th century is way of thinking incapable of grasping the dialectical contradictions of development of the objective world and of the process of knowledge itself. Most Western philosophers adopting realist positions in their positivist interpretation also oppose metaphysics, understanding by it any system of knowledge that declines to reduce the objective to complex of the subject´s observations. From the standpoint of materialism dialectics the holders of these conceptions of subjective>idealism realism, can be justifiably classed as methaphysicist; they cannot cope with the task of constructing uncontraditory epistemological conceptions because a denial of the dialectical contradictoriness of the object world, which exists independently of the set subjective sensations, underlies them. Clarified the term of Metaphysics and is variation through the human history, we can manage the complexity in achieving the results of knowledge. The assumption that the elementary sensation already contained the general within itself, but only in an embryonic, undeveloped state, led to conceptions of a sort of gnosiological prefigurism that wiped out the qualitative boundary between sensation and reason. The striving to shake of prefiguristic extremes led to new, unresolvable dilemmas.

 The mechanism of the rise of general concepts from an aggregate of sense data appears as a process of the discovery of constant, invariant characteristics during the manifold superimposing of various projections of the sense image on one another. After many repetitions of the projecting of objects in the memory, everything chance and secondary is discarded and the most frequently repeated and permanent is ultimately traced out and identified with the universal. A general concept is thus formed, derived as it were from the background of universal. A general concept is thus formed, derived as it were from the background of individual sense perceptions rather like, for example, the technique by which periodically repeated weak signals are sorted out distinctly from background noise in a radio receiver. The idea of the birth of general concepts through discovery of repeated moments in the connections < associations > of various psychic phenomena, which follows from the main postulate of sensationism, was developed further by associative psychologists. The weakness of the argumentation of the supporters of this method of extracting the general from the particular was not so much that the general was identified with most frequently repeated as that there was repetition in fact where was general pattern and necessity. But repetition of the results of observations still cannot serve, in itself, as evidence of the truth of concepts, judgments, or deductions based on it, if we are thinking of the frequency of the pattern of events perceived directly by the sense from the organs. It does not follow, for example, because Europeans have seen only white swans millions of times, that the statement < all swans are white > is true, excluding the possibility of even just one non white swan being discovered in objective reality. If the repetition of results deduced from immediate sense data were in fact sufficient grounds for doming concepts more or less adequately reflecting the objective sources of the phenomenon´s repetition, we would have to acknowledge the existence in many spices of a capacity for conceptual thought their analyzers also fix the similarity of perceived situations in which they find themselves many by virtue of life linked with the specific environment of their habitat. The deductions of a general concept from a consecutive series of direct observations could at best be considers attainable only if the series were admitted to be fully completed.

The repetition of a sensually perceived succession of event cannot serve as a reliable basis for the formation of judgments about an inner, causally conditioned connection between them along the lines of every appearance of event < A necessarily entails the appearance of event B >. If we could not go beyond the bounds of direct sense fixation of events, repeated following of events on one another would, at best, serve as grounds for a post hoc statement, but a proper hoc one. In that case we would have to express doubt, following David Hume, in the objective existence of causality, assuming that perception of a regular following of event B on event A leads to a mistaken conviction that grows into a stable association of expectation, to habit, and finally to a faith that every appearance of event A in the future will entail the appearance of event B. The interpretation of the main postulate of sensationism, namely that, there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the sense, proved so hopeless that it was proposed, as a way out of the impasse in general, `remove´ the question of the objective content of general concepts, and to eliminate it from scientific currency as wrongly formulated. Absolutising of the sensory aspect was one of gnosiological roots of subjective idealism, including its neopositivist trends. All actual reality was reduced somehow to an aggregate of direct sense data, to a ´set of sensations ´ without any underlying objective basis. General concepts or categories were declared fictions without cognitive significance since they could not be verified by direct experimental data. The problem of whether they reflected any essential aspects of objective reality itself, as ´pseudo questions ´ that are allegedly outside the data of experience, are metaphysical, and should not interest positive science. Some of the latest holders of such a point of view were the logical positivists, who sought a way out the dramatic situation by developing a probability logic. Rudolf Carnap, philosopher an logician, leader of neopositivism, characterizing the difference between scientific knowledge and the data of direct observation, remarked that the former was formulated in terms of logical thought, while the latter represented an incomplete series and could only provide information of probable character which was displayed in the relative frequency of the observed events. According to him, probability logic is an inductive logic based on the degree of confirmation of statement. To some extent this logic resembles deductive logic. Both are a system of purely a priori relations, according to Carnap, independent of the facts and of the truth or falsity of the premises leading to them. Deductive logic, moreover, in spite of its limited nature, gives definitive, complete result, while probability gives only different degrees of confirmation. Probability inductive logic is an extension of deductive logic through the addition of a certain new function of confirmation.

 

The idea that the age>old dispute between rationalism and sensationism was to be resolved by probability logic in favour of the latter received clear expression in the work of Dr. Hans Reichenbach, German philosopher and logician, he was one of the organizers of the society of Scientific Philosophy in Berlín, which, with the Viena circle formed the basis for the movement of logical positivism. He subject Kant to sharp criticism for having, in his view, only succeeded, while claiming to unite sensationism and rationalism into a single whole, in ´cluttering up´ the concept of experience with rational moments; the sensationist, to their misfortune, accepted the rationalist postulate of the possibility of complete proof, by virtue of which consistent sensationism led in the person of David Hume to inevitable skepticism. As Reichenbach considers, the new achievements of the natural sciences < non-Euclidean geometry, the theory of organic evolution, the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics > are freeing thought from the bonds of rationalism and leading to a conclusion about the unacceptability of the rigid determinism that rationalism had long been trying to drag into science. The development of logistic logic, Reichenbach claims, has shown that the whole apparatus of logic and mathematics that rationalism tried to impose on reality consists of tautologies and lacks factual content. It is necessary to see the way out in the fact that ´the problem of probability . . . contains the nucleus of every theory knowledge`. As one of the critics of this conception has noted, growth of our knowledge means that we are passing to theories with decreasing probability rather than increasing in the sense of calculus of probability, so that high probability does not coincide with the goal of progress of knowledge. In the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, it should be noted, probability relations are given great importance, for they are treated as manifestations of their inner natural connections of phenomena. The weakness of the positions of orthodox sensationism had already been guessed by eighteenth century rationalist. Unlike the sensationalist they defended the proporsition that the general character of concepts could not be deduced from an adding together of sense data. The intellect disposed of an additional faculty, apart from concatenation of ´sensa `, that enabled the mind to extract reliable knowledge of a universal and necessary character from observed reality. But did this ´addition` come from that gave reason a new quality in principle compared with feeling, if this quality did not exist in the sense data themselves? The rationalists counterpoised their inherent faith in the omnipotence of reason not only to a narrow sensationalism but also to religious dogmas that declared the intervention of a supernatural creative force not amenable to rational explanation to be the source of man´s capacity for logical thought. The rationalists made no small contribution in the history of philosophy to the fight against various forms of irrationalism and religious mysticism. Having called in question the postulate of the direct intervention of the n will of the divine creator in the cognitive process < which it was far from safe to do when a religious outlook predominated > and not being able to discover the basis in actual reality itself that would make it possible to unite the sensory and rational degrees of knowledge logically and equivalently, the rationalists could not, apparently come to any other conclusion than to explain the capacity for logical thought by inherent capacity of the human mind itself that found expression in intellectual intuition. Just as the eyes see form, color, etc., the mind , by-passing the data of sense organs, directly grasps universal and necessary connections expressed in the concepts. If sense experience also has a place in the mind´s direct judging of universal truths, it is simply as a kind of catalyst promoting manifestation of the logical schemes that are being examined by the reason. This rupture between sensibility and rationality led to an antinomy of conceptions, and the origin of consciousness remained an open question. If a capacity for logical thought is given to man by nature, then why has nature endowed only man with this quality, and refused it to other members of the animate world? Absolutisation of the rational aspect of knowledge was reflected as well in various forms of objective idealism, which ´found` a way out of the difficulties by declaring that general concepts or universals underlay the universe. The problem of the origin of consciousness did not essentially a consciousness in general, an Absolute Idea.

It is not out of place to recall Hegel´s approach to this matter. From the general proposition he put forward, expressed in the triad ´the absolute Idea- Nature- Spirit or Absolute Reality < developed in his Logic > it followed that consciousness in general, was ´materialized ` in Nature and by-passing through Nature was again ´dematerialized ´ in human consciousness. In the ´Phenomenology of Mind `Hegel treated the genesis of human consciousness as the process of its becoming and development from elementary forms of sensation to the highest levels of theoretical thought. The problem of the antinomy of sensory knowledge and the logically highest level of knowledge was removed, as is generally characteristic of conceptions of objective idealism, but in Hegel it was removed dialectically, in a masterly fashion. The sensual was treated as the cause of the awakening of the mental or spiritual as a level of development of consciousness in general that contained not only isolated, concrete data in itself, but also something general that was already manifested at the level of perceptive consciousness in the form of as yet very ´meager `abstractions. Because of his dialectical approach Hegel succeeded in greey, though in a idealist form, certain essential aspects of man´s objectified activity, and in coming close to an explanation of his history as the result of his own labour. In starting from the mediated character of human activity, Hegel made a number of profound remarks about the qualitative difference between man´s thinking and the psychic activity of animals. He put forward, in particular, an important thesis about the ´cunning`of reason to pit forces of nature against one another to realize set aims. Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. It should very good to remember the Hegel´s complex historical period; the last philosophical work “ Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts” is one of the most controversial books written by Hegel during the dark, and why not to say, frightful period of the revengeful Saint Alliance, when the French Revolution had been completely overcome . During these years, Hegel could hardly survive with the witch chasing by the bailiffs of Matternich. After the historical Vienna Congress, Hegel’s theoretical language became more hermetic and cryptic, being forced, in order to survive, to abjure his spiritual strength, freedom ideals < Notice Fichte had been dismissed, as a Philosophy Professor from Jena and Berlin Universities, accused of atheism>. All his restlessness was left behind, his radical struggles, his young fervor for Napoleon and the French Revolution, his uprising against the feudal regime of the Prussian monarchy. Farewell to the conspiracy nights in turbulent revolutionary actions. From 1818, when he was appointed as Berlin University Professor to 1831, when he died, Hegel is re-defined as the philosopher and ideologist of the new monarchical Prussia. This stigma has marked his name until now.

However . . . .

We have to agree that Hegel language during this period is often ambiguous as when he states that “ the State is divine on earth”, expression that is misunderstood by commentators, since what Hegel meant was to calm down the anger for the new master of Europe, the Austrian count and prince, Klemens Metternich Winneburg < for Hegel the is permanent >;Hegel´s late work is full of these examples. But here he shows himself brave enough is in the last page of the Preface to “ The Fundaments of Philosophy of Right “ which is a real canto to the matter. There Hegel writes textually: “. . .To say even a word about teaching of how the world should be, it is obvious, certainly, that philosophy often comes too late. As a world thinking it only appears in the time only after actuality has completed its formation process and it already set and finished. This, what the concept teaches, history shows it with the same need; that is to say, that only in actuality maturity appears the ideal opposite the real, and it builds this same world, apprehending in its substance, in the figure of an intellectual reign When philosophy paints its gray on the gray, a life figure has already aged and with gray on gray, it does not allow be rejuvenated but only know; Minerva´s owl flies up at the twilight . . .” Heine rightly states: “ This Hegel is a damned atheist “. And if Heine says, it is something, since Heine, one of the best representatives of The German poetry < 27 years younger than the master >, was a revolutionary democrat, being the first to realize the revolutionary character inherent to the German classical philosophy and particularly to Hegel´s dialectics. This page, closing the preface to his philosophy of Right is, no doubt, a message to future generations, to keep from misunderstanding his texts, as they have the testamentary force of giving to matter his best right to be the first. I think that by now is not necessary to put Hegel unguilty as for the treawon to the postulates upon which he built his philosophical theory.. We consider rather unhelpful to start a discussion because actually the Hegelianism is in the very center of this gnoseological confrontation.. It is not by chance that when we began this æsthetics—philosophical essay, we assured that the human thinking, from its very beginning, has been object of a hard ideological struggle, particularly on the interpretation field.

 

Returning on one´s word < before Hegel´s disquisition>.

The premises of objective idealism could not lead to solution of the problem of the relation of the sensory and the rational. Since Nature was declared the `other´ of the absolute idea, the principle of the identity of thought and being underlying Hegelian philosophy was essentially reduced to that of the identity of thought with itself, while the historical process of the origin and development of various levels of knowledge was interpreted as one of self knowledge of the Absolute Idea by itself. Thus, in contrast to materialists, who considered sense images to be `copies ´ of real objects, the adherents of objective idealism declared objective reality itself to be the creation of some universal reason which was contained from the very outset in sensation. That point of view held by one the last eminent advocates of rationalist idealism, Brand Blanshard, who tried < in the spirit of Hegel, but without Hegel´s dialectic> to substantiate the thesis that the object is nothing other than the fully realized idea. According to him, sensation already contained some repeated or universal element in itself, in its sources. If universals had not been present in experience from the outset they could not have appeared at more developed stages of the cognitive process ; therefore there were already general concepts in the perceptions of animals. Without universals there could be no identification. In his”The Nature of Thought, vol. 1, page 62, Blanshard says: “ For if we are really confined to transient particulars, then every judgment of recognition, every identification of anything, and in the last resort every perception, is a snare and delution “.  Being far from a dialectical materialist understanding of the origin of consciousness, Blanshard did not see the profound qualitative differences between the mechanism of identification in the psyche of animals and the consciousness of men. The thesis about intellectual intuition advanced by early rationalists was developed in philosophical conception that found their logical completion in conclusions directly opposed to their intentions of confirming the power of reason. The founder of the phenomenological school, Edmund Husserl, and his disciples, for instance, starting from recognition of the impossibility of synthesizing rational thought with sensory experience, tried to build a “pure” logic of knowledge by banishing sense data completely from the sphere of consciousness. Excessive concentration on mind´s capacity for direct judgment of truth, typical of the early rationalists, led to conceptions of intuitionism and the associated attempts to bring subconscious factors to the fore in the cognitive process. One of the most famous representatives of the intuitionist interpretation of knowledge, Henri Bergson, considered man to be capable, thanks to intuition, of learning the secrets of being without any mediating link, even forms of the logical level of knowledge < reasoning, abstraction, generalization>. In his view mind directly contemplated mind in intuition without any intermediaries. In intuition there was an indivisible, and therefore substantially continuous, flow of inner life, this contemplation, which can hardly be distinguished from the contemplated object of knowledge, is contiguous and almost coincident. One of the epistemological roots of idealism is the singling out and excessive inflation of some one aspect of the universal connection of phenomena. Materialist sharply criticize the adherents of intuitiveness, but not because they, for their part, deny the existence of moments of intuition in the process of knowledge. The idealism of the intuitivists does not stem from the fact that they recognize the role of intuition, but from their absolutising of it, their effort to represent it in itself as the sole means of understanding truth. The essence of intuition is reduced, moreover, to a mystic capacity of the subject that is not rationally explicable, while the objective bases of its origin remain outside their keen. The existence of intuitive moments in thought was noted long ago in the past. As an special form of cognitive activity, Descartes, for example, held that the deductive form of proof rest on axioms; the latter are understood purely intuitively, without any proof; according to Descartes intuition in combination with the deductive method serves as a universal criterion of complete truth.Intuition also holds a big place in the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, who considered it the most fruitful and important knowledge grasping the essence of things.

The very of protracted dispute between sensationist and rationalists, and the difficulties associated with its resolution, witnessed to the qualitative difference between feelings and reason, surmised to some extent intuitively, and not capable of easy exposition in scientific terms . As Gustav Bergman remarked in his “ The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism”, page 45:...´all sensible statements must be either analytical or empirical and synthetic. Truths that are related to facts cannot be outside experience <unexperienced> but analytical statements belong to the unexperienced: and though they are tautological, i.e. empty < in the sense of the existence of substance or content>, there really is a difference between them and empirical statements´. According to Bergman, this difference, is grasped intuitively, and is not created or dreamed up by philosophers. The failure of attempts at deducing rational thought directly from the aggregate of sense data led to the idea of some sort that would play the role of an intermediary in the transition from the sensory to the rational through a tree-members formula ´sensation-x-reason´. It was also remarked that discovery of this unknown middle link would be an important milestone in the history of philosophical thought, capable of ending the incompatibility of the postulates of sensationism and rationalism. The idea was firs developed most clearly by Immanuel Kant, founder of classical German idealism. He thought he had succeeded in making a radical change in philosophy thanks to discovery of unknown third term of understanding. While giving their due to the Lockean sensation-term of understanding. While giving their due to the Lockean sensationism who tried to trace the process of the ascent from separate perceptions to general concepts. Kant affirmed thats it was impossible to pass from the sensory to the rational in that way. In his “ Critique of Pure Reason” Kant assert “ a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of course cannot be made in this way . . . . It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means and empirical one: also that all attempts at by no means and empirical one:also that all attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure a priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of those conceptions”. He expressed himself even more categorically against the possibility of deducing cognitive understanding from the principles of logic. Any attempt to employ the data of logic. “ as an instrument <organon> in order to extend and enlarge the range of our know edge end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever”. < see ´Critique of Pure Reason´> He also subjected the thesis of the existence of an intellectual intuition that comprehended truth directly, by-passing the sense organs, to well-founded criticism.

 

Kant considered productive imagination, which generated a cognitive a priori synthesis, to be a thid form of understanding, free of the one-sidedness of both empirical and rational knowledge, that made it the it possible at the same time to synthesize sense data. He made it the basis of the structure of his transcendental schema. “Because every phenomenon contains a manifold content, diverse perceptions consequently are broken up in the mind properly considered and met as single details, so a connection is needed between them which cannot be in the faculty < sense> itself. We therefore have an active faculty < capacity> to synthesis these manifolds which we call imagination, and whose activity aimed directly at perception I call apprehension”. When disclosing the process of “ apprehension” Kant found a place in it for the reproductive faculty of imagination an the associative connection of notions. But the content of his “ apprehension” differed radically from sensationist conceptions of the formation of general concepts, according to him, are formed through the ordering of sense data in the human mind, which possesses a productive faculty of imagination, rather than through the direct building-up of sense data. Because of the activity inherent in the mind, the final result of the formation of single and multiple perceptions in it differs qualitative from the initial material because the sense perceptions are ordered according to certain rules given by rational schema produced by the productive imagination, rather than as we wish them to be ordered. The multitude of scattered and isolated perceptions is thus reduced to a system and acquires unity in a determination of sensibility. Productive imagination supplies perception supplies perception with images, but these images differ from direct sensual ones. See “ Critique of Pure Reason” pp.118>119. “The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination. But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image. Thus, if I place five points one after another. . .this is in an image of the number five. On the aether hand, if I only think a number in general, which may be either five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in a image an sum< e.g.. a thousand> in conformity with a conception, than the which I should find some little difficulty in reviewing and comparing with the conception”. The activity of the productive imagination is the source of the “additional “ property that general concepts-categories-possess, in contrast to the unique and differing data of sense experience. On the other hand Kant´s “ apprehension “ also differs in principle from rationalists notions of intellectual intuition. Productive imagination grasps the general in phenomena, not through the mind´s direct consideration of general patterns, by-passing the sense organs; on the contrary the activity of the imagination works, as it were, on sense data putting them into order. Finally, the real weakness of the premises of Kant´s philosophical system did not allow him to disclose the true reason for the transition from sensory knowledge to logical understanding. He himself understood that substantiation of the role of productive imagination as the third link connecting the sensory and the rational required an answer to several question. We shall touch on two of them.. How is a synthesis of the sensory to the rational, possible if there are no general concepts in the sense data, .i.e. categories, and categories are not reducible to an aggregate of sense data? Where is the source of the formation of this faculty of the mind that is called productive imagination?

 

To the firs question, Kant gave a satisfactory answer; it was possible if there a mediating representation that was homogeneous with categories on the one hand sense data <phenomena> on the other. “It is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on the other....Thismediating representation must be pure < without any empirical content>, and yet must on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous”. <ibid., above-mentioned> Underlying his transcendental schema < which, Kant thought, was this intermediate link>there was representation of time and space. Kant understood time “as pure inner contemplation”, as for space, it “ is merely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense” ´for the eternal sense the pure image of all qualities < quantorum> is space´. According to him, inner feeling, by means of which the subject in fact comprehended itself insofar as it operated internally on itself. His thesis about the inner activity of self-activity of the subject, as the source of productive imagination, was associated with the leading role of representation of time as ´the pure image of all objects of sense in general`. The thesis that representations of time and space have a most important place in the shaping of thought, in its materialist interpretation, is very profound. A time link between conditioned stimuli and unconditioned reflexes, accompanied with reinforcement, already inherent in animals at level of sensory reflection of reality, in fact underlies the development of animals complex conditioned-reflex behavior. But Kant himself interpreted representations of time and space from subjective idealist positions remote from their recognition as forms of existence of objective reality. Since the mediating form of understanding that bridges lit sensory and rational level was purely subjective property of mind itself < in Kant´s view>, it was a faculty of productive imagination, and the latter had to do with unmediated sense data that in turn became facts of consciousness, understanding < knowledge> this not and could not go beyond the limits of the world of phenomena. The universality and necessity proper to categories therefore did not reflect an objectively existing inner connection of phenomena. In Kant´s view active, creative role of understanding was not that men understood objective laws that did not depend on their consciousness, and employed them to transform the objective world in their practical activity, but that consciousness itself created laws < patterns> at its own discretion and prescribed them to nature.>ibid., above-mentioned p.184> “ Consequently we ourselves import the order and regularity into phenomena that we call Nature, and they also cannot be found in phenomena we or the nature of our mind has originally put them there”. Kant considered concatenation and the oblective world to be separated by an impenetrable, beyond which consciousness could not, in principle, go. If it could be admitted that this barrier were in any way surmountable, the capacity to do so belonged to faith rather than consciousness. The supersensitive dawning by which faith apptrended the essence of the thing-in-itself that lay on the other side of the wall that consciousness could not penetrate was logically inexplicable, and therefore could not be classed as the subject-matter of science. As Kant himself remarked, he had to limit knowledge so as to free room for faith. As for the source of the productive faculty of imagination, he found no other answer than the assumption that it preceded any empirical understanding and was given a priori.

 

Despite his conviction that he had succeeded in solving the connection between sensation and reason through discovery of the productive faculty of imagination < a problem that his predecessors had struggled with unsuccessfully>, Kant did not even try to explain the origin of this faculty, considering it an innate property of the human mind. Furthermore, he expressed himself extremely pessimistically < in accordance with his conclusions about the unknowability of the thing-in-itself> about the possibility of the mechanism of the faculty of forming general concepts, and working with them, being discovered at any time in the future. “ this schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil”.<ibidem, book above-mentioned, p.119>. We have dwelt on the Kantian solution of the relation between the sensory and the rational in such detail because several of Kant´s theses, which have still not their topicality, can be employed when investigate the really complex mechanism of the transition from the sensory level of knowledge to conceptual thought, and so prove useful for further analysis of the problem we are discussing. We must allow, moreover, that the Kantian conception is often employed by today´s philosophical schools in the main to construct subjective idealist schemes in epistemology and psychology < that is an essential feature of most neokantian´s turn to the right from Kant>. A critical rethinking of the Kantian heritage has therefore not lost its significance for disclosing the gnosiological roots of the latest trends of idealism now reflected in the form of “ realism”. Kant´s idea of the need to introduce a third link determining the transition from sensory to rational knowledge was quite justified in its most general form. It is not fortuitous that many philosopher´s who do not go to the extremes of nominalist, solipsism, and idealist ´realism` of a Platonic true, have turned to this idea. Bernard Russell, for instance, made several attempts to eliminate the contradiction between propositions affirming, on the one hand, that sense data are the soul source of our knowledge of the world, and on the other hand that our knowledge contains information about unperceived objects outside sensory experience. In his search for a satisfactory solution of this problem moreover, he changed his point of view several times, passing from positions close to Berkeleianism to Humism, and then to a natural materialism. The range of his wavering between theses extremes was indirect evidence, in fact, of the difficulties of coping with the problems posed. When summing up his unsuccessful attempts to deduce the process of understanding simply from sense data, Bertrand Rusell remarked that he had previously limited himself too much to the verifiable and that the attempt to construct knowledge in terms of perception in terms of perception was ultimately simply an attempt to develop a certain technical hypothesis. Rusell hoped to find the way out of the situation < when he moved away from Berkeleianism and Machism > by introducing some reliable principle of induction that would help ´unite` sense data and knowledge of objects that lay beyond direct observation. Back in the initial period of his work , he had assumed they intuition and instinct must have a certain role in substantiating induction. Not seeing any possibility of disclosing the nature of is reliable principle of induction, he limited himself in the end to listing several postulates that < in his opinion > underlay the process of knowledge, but which were neither empirical nor logical < quasi-permanence, separable causal lines, space temporal continuity in causal lines, common causal origin of similar structure, analogy >. The real grounds for accepting them were deeply rooted, according to him, in the fact that they seemed inescapable, and that people had a propensity to rely on them. < See Bertrand Rusell. 2 Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limit´s page 488>.

 

Adherents of the hypothetical-deductive method deduce the role of a link that enable them to overcome the incompatibility of the postulates in sensationism and rationalism from a special faculty of the knowing subject that can be called the faculty of advancing hypotheses. This faculty has a certain resemblance to the Kantian productive imagination, being a faculty of creating assumtions about the forms of connection in some ordered whole of various observed phenomena. These forms of connection themselves, moreover, go beyond direct sense experience; they are not observed, but are ´dreamed up` by the subject of knowledge. But after they have taken shape in the subject´s head they can be confirmed < or refuted > by subsequent observations and experiments. One of the fathers of pragmatism, Charles Peirce, pointed out the importance in the development of knowledge of ´qualitative induction` , which consists in a process of bringing forward hypotheses and selecting them according to certain criteria < abduction > , and process of experimental testing, and rejection of those that do not stand up to the test < retroduction >. The suggestion that have a certain meaning < significance> in the growth of knowledge was later developed by many thinker. John Dewey, for instance, considered that hypothetical judgments presented a possibility of getting out of the situations of discrepancy or difficulty apprehended during experit. According to him, a hypothesis “ involves a leap, a jump, the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted in advance, no matter what precautions be taken”.<See: ´How We Think`, by John Dewey,p.75> The birth of hypothesis defies control and involves. . . .“ the formation of habits of mind which are at once enterprising and cautious. . ., the selection and arrangement of the particular facts”.<ibidem>. Dewey´s thesis about the ´jump-like`transition from the sensory level of knowledge to the rational through hypotheses is not evidence of a dialectical approach on his part to the solution of his problem. The solution does not consist, in principle, in explaining the passage from sensation to reason as the result of an inexplicable leap < a spasmodic transition to a new quality actually must take place> but in disclosing the objective criteria of the qualitative transition, showing its necessity and explaining the nature of the mechanism of its operation that leads, by virtue of objective causes, precisely to that result and not some other. But Dewey did not manage to do that. Dewey tried to dissociate himself from the extreme subjective idealist conceptions that reduce knowledge to purely psychological processes. He pointed out that biological factors in man´s adaptation to his environment played a certain role in the process of understanding, and that certain logical operations included physical activity and called for the use of material instruments < e.g. Microscopes and balance in a scientific experiment>. The general premises and conclusions from his instrumentalist were nevertheless evidence that his conception did not go beyond the form of idealism represented by ´neutral`monism. Dewey considered the various forms of knowledge as instruments by which certain vague, unsatisfactory situations were transformed into definite, satisfactory ones. When that idea is given a materialist interpretation it is valuable, but it had a subjectively idealist sense to Dewey, since he considered the object of knowledge to be generated by the act of knowing itself. According to him the object of knowledge was `subject-matter so far as it been produced and ordered in settled form by means inquiry´. The objects themselves were never simply given, but were manifested in experience only as `the objectives of inquiry´. <See: Logic. The theory of Inquiry p.119>

 

The faculty of the subject of understanding to generate and order the objects of inquiry < productive imagination, ability to put forward original hypotheses, etc.> began to attract more and more attention insofar as epistemologicsts interest was shifted from problems of the logical substantiation of already available, ready-made knowledge to the discovery of patterns < laws> of creative thought that generate knowledge. There was thus, perhaps, a tendency to exaggerate this faculty < just as the sensationalists and rationalists exhibited an inclination in their day, each in his own way, to absolutise the the role either of sense observations or of intelligent judgments >. We must note that although Kant allotted an important place to productive imagination in the process of understanding, he limited its place < as we have already shown > to the role of the middle link that made it possible to bridge the gap between the sensory and rational aspects of understanding. He relatedly warned against those fruits of the unrestrained play of imagination that can grow in complete isolation from the soil of experiment and the requirement of reason. He remarked in a letter that only those statements are meaningful for a scientist that he can always repeat in experiments, while the ignoramus collects results that may well have been wholly generated from the imagination whether of the observer or of the observed person, and therefore cannot be subjected to a real experiment. < see: “Kant´s Briefwechsel” vol. 2-p.140> He expressed himself even more categorically in another letter, remarking that imagination destroyed itself by arbitrary action, degenerating into downright insanity; When the imagination is no longer controlled by reason and even conversely tries to enslave the latter, man falls from the state < sphere> of humanity to that of dreams and fantasies. < See: “Kant an Fürst von Beloselsky p.633”>In is day could hardly be supposed that a time would come when some eminent natural scientist would come when some not only be favourably disposed to putting forward ´crazy` ideas, but would also complain that lack of such ideas was holding back the growth of scientific knowledge. A striving to regard understanding as a process of the growth   of knowledge, which has its own history, is typical in particular of spokesmen of critical realism and critical Rationalism; both of them, without going into the particulars of these doctrines, let us   dwell only on the aspect of it that relates to the problems of connexion in the passage from sensory to   rational knowledge. These trends are not a clearly defined philosophical doctrines and are often designated by other terms, such as critical empiricism, criticism, or falsifications. In contrast to traditional epistemology these problems are considered   now through the prim of   the empirical and theoretical levels of understanding. It can, however, be noted that this point of view could not eliminate the ´blanks` lefts from the unresolved problems of the past. The non-inferability of theoretical knowledge   from empirical knowledge and the irreducibility of the former to the latter, have become no less a sumbling-block to explanation of the mechanism of the rise of new knowledge than the   incompatibility of the initial postulates of sensationism and rationalism that tormented thinkers of the past.

 

An attempt has been made, moreover, to get around the tragic dualism of the sensory and the rational, the empirical and the theoretical, by turning neopositive precepts inside out. If the truth of general concepts   and universals cannot be verified in fact by data of observations, however far their finite series is extended, stretching to bad infinity, a single observation is often sufficient to doubt their truth. For however often we have observed white swans, it is sufficient to see just one black one in order to find the falseness of the atatement that all swans are white. The   question arises whether, having rejected the inductivist principle of verification, it is possible to affirm the principle of falsification in its place as the criterion for confirming the scientific importance of a theory, i.e. its refutation by just one empirically established or hypothetically possible fact. In that case the centre of gravity in explaining the pattern of growth of scientific knowledge is shifted to elimination of the old theory so as to make room for the new. But very new theory can only claim to be scientific when it in turn presents possibilities for its refutation. Every new theory must thus share of the old one. With that approach the growth of scientific knowledge looks like a chain of successive theories each of which is ultimately proved false, properly speaking, they cannot even be called theories, if by such we understand some logically strict system of reliable knowledge. So we are concerned with systems of hypotical knowledge, i.e. hypotheses. Karl Raimund Popper, Austrian philosopher, logician and sociologist, took such a turn toward absolutising the hypothetical character of scientific knowledge. Popper opposed his conception of critical rationalism to logical positivism, despite the fact that he was influenced by the latter. He substituted the principle of falsification for the principle of verification, and the principles of organic connection between the theoretical and empirical levels of knowledge for narrow empiricism and based on the postulate of formal logic which says that a theoretical proposition is disproved if its refutation logically follows from a multitude of mutually compatible statements based on observation. Proceeding from this logical postulate, Popper countered the neo-positivist principle of verification with the principle of falsification, which he interpreted not as means of determining the comprehensibility of a scientific proposition, but as a method of distinguishing between the scientific and nonscientific According to Popper, only statements that can in principle be falsified are scientific; those that are not susceptible of falsification are not. Its clear that the conception of logic and methodology of science considers falsification a particular means, subordinate to practice, of verifying scientific theories.< Main Works: ´Objective Knowledge`, ´Conjectures and Refutations`, ´The Logic of Scientific Discovery`>. Karl Popper took such a turn toward absolutising the hypothetical character of scientific knowledge. From his standpoint the development of scientific knowledge, being a process of the constant succession of hypothetical constructs, leads to the posing of ever more complex and refined problems. These constructs < just as Popper theories> are, as it were, a network, comparable in some respects with Kant´s rational schema, that is cast onto the world so as to rationalise, to explain, and to master it. And for that ´we endeavor to make the mesh ever finer and finer`. The opposition of the data of sensory experience and logical thought, of empirical fact and theoretical construct, seems thus to be overcome insofar as empirical facts are ´theoretically loaded` < in the same way as Kant´s mediating representation was on the one hand intellectual and on the sensory >. As Popper himself wrote in the page 59 of his ´ Logic of scientific Discovery`. “My point of view is, briefly, that our ordinary language is full of theories; that observation is always observation in the light of theories; and that it is only the inductivist prejudice which leads people to think that there could be a phenomenal language, free of theories, and distinguishable from a theoretical language”. Many examples can be taken from the history of science, of course, when a fact became observable only after its existence had been forecast by theory. But that is scarcely grounds for saying that these facts, or the events manifested in them, only exist in imagination and the language of theorists.

 

Exaggeration of the role of productive imagination, and of the faculty to construct bold hypotheses, led in the final analyst to the conception of methological anarchism. This faculty began to be treated no longer as the link that made it possible to connect the sensory and the rational, the empirical and theoretical, but as something in which this opposition was dissolved rather than absorbed. Not only the difference between theory and the fact but also that between science and myths disappears, as is typical of the conception of the North American philosopher Paul Feyerabend. This scientist operates outside any rules of the rational whatsoever, but himself by his actions constitutes rationality. Feyerabend wrote in is “ Against Method. . .Theory of Knowledge” p.43 ´A scientist is an inventor not only of theories but also of facts, standards, forms of rationality, in word , an inventor of entire forms of life. . .´ And further forward, p. 44 “ gives rise to specific behavior which in turn to creates the circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it rational”. We are far from denying the significance of emotion in creative endeavour of the scientist or from not seeing a common element in mythological and logical thinking, but we shall try to show later that the key to the complex problems of interconnection of the various aspectes of cognitive activity lies in the monistic methodology of dialectical materialism rather than in subjective conceptions in general and methodological anarchism in particular. Thus idea, profound in its posing, that if conceptual thought cannot be directly deduced from sense experience, some third link must be sought that would lead to the transition from the sensory to the rational, could not find satisfactory solution in the conceptions considered above. We may also note that, inspite of the modifications in the treatment of the nature of this sought-after link, the conceptions that recognise the expediency of introducing it as an intermediary between sensibilia and universals have something in common.

Summary, in short:

firs. The attitude of knowing subject to the object of knowledge is treated as their direct link in the classical dyadic subject-object scheme. The separate attempts to introduce such objects as the instruments used in understanding as the middle link between subject and object were not developed in these conceptions.

Secondly. The transition from sense perceptions to logical thought is treated exclusively as the product of the individual´s subjective cognitive faculty, whatever name is given to it < productive faculty of imagination, faculty of making hypotheses, similarity in memory, etc.>.

Thirdly. The knowing subject is linked with the object of knowledge through his organs. This link is a direct one since the organs are an integral part of the knowing subject. Even if it is assumed the sense data play the role of intermediary between logical thought and the object of knowledge, the general formula of a direct link between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge is not altered thereby, because the difference between feeling and reason is traced only within the knowing subject.

Each of the theses considered above contains a pointer to some aspect of the cognitive process that may really be present in certain cognitive acts. Nevertheless, they lead, when taken in isolation from the general patterns of the development of knowledge, into a labyrinth from which there is no way out. In fact, when the basis for differentiating the sensory and rational levels of knowledge is found only within the subject of knowledge we may conclude that we are capable of knowing only our own sensations. The subject´s capacity to create general concept from single and isolated sense data is thus treated as a mystic, incomprehensible faculty whose source is not amenable to rational explanation. On the other hand, the thesis that, although the knowing subject deals only with his own sensations, but is at the same time linked through them with the object of understanding, seems to make it possible to get out of the blind alley of solipsism. But since the subject´s link with the object is thereby reduced simply reduced simply to a direct conception, another difficulty arises the also seems insuperable. The organism´s direct,unmediated link with the environment, taken by itself, excluded any possibility of grasping the inner patterns, hidden from the sense organs of the course of objective processes. If we even grant that our sense organs are capable of directly grasping the inner links of the objects of observation, we could not perceive them as anything distinct from the directly observed phenomena themselves. Some hypothetical subject, while possessing a faculty of perceiving inner patterns directly, might have perceived the law of universal gravitation from observing the satarry heavens. But in that case Issac Newton´s famous formulation of this law would have been indistinguishable from the visible movement of the planets. As Hegel remarked, the laws of celestial mechanics are not traced in the heavens. To discovered the law of universal gravitation it took an immense expenditure of theoretical thought over the lifetime of many generations, before it was finally formulated as a mathematical equation the had no apparent similarity to the sense perceived distribution of the planets. The paradoxicalness of the assumption of the capacity to grasps objective laws of nature independent of consciousness, by direct sensory perception, was already quite clear to Kant. But as it was also clear to him that we have no other channels of connection with the world around us than the data of the sense organs, he found no other way out than to admit the inknowability in principle of the thing-in-itself. Attempts to introduce a three-term relation, sensation-x-reason, were thus limited by this relation´s being irremovable from the innermost world of the subject of perception. As for the subject´s relation to his environment, it boils down to his direct connection with the perceived object according to the classical subject-object scheme. The idealist conceptions who tried to link sensibilia with universals by introducing an intermediate link started from an unhistorical approach to the connection between the sensory and the rational. The question of the transition from sensory reflection of reality to a rational one as a process of the rise of consciousness during the evolution of life remained outside their field of view. They considered consciousness as formed, and already containing a difference between the sensory and rational aspects.. Accordingly, the mediating representation was treated in a form of a link between the sensory and rational inherent in man from birth, and given to him a priori. Contemporaneous philosopher have paid much attention to the epistemological analysis of sense perception and its relation to rational knowledge. Some have substantiated the thesis that the gnosiological relations expressed in the classical dyad ´subject-object`suffers from several essential shortcomings. We are going to discuss in greater detail the point that the ´subject-object `relation reveals its limitation in the light of the fundamental propositions of dialectical materialism, which makes it doubtful that it can be used to analyses the transition from the sensory reflection to the rational. But insofar as we are concerned with precisely that aspect of the problem, it is convenient to cite some of the conclusions here who are critical of this shortcomings.

In materialist dialectical work it has been substantiated that a tree-member relation, i.e´subject-activity-object`, is typical of man´s connection with his environment, rather than a two member one, the subject´s activity thus being interpreted as a ´system with its own structure, inner transition and transformation, and development`, rather than as a reaction or aggregate of reactions. According to dialectical materialism, human activity does not exist in any other form than as an act or series of acts, although both these concepts reflect realities that are not coincident. The difference he draws between the concepts of acts pertaining to ends of goals, and the concept of operations that relate to conditions, is a real one. It is the fate of the latter that they sooner or later become the functions of machines and automata, dropping out of man´s activity. Starting from the idea that the decisive factor in the transition from the direct sensory reflection inherent in animals to mans cognitive thought is labour, he singled out the role of the product of labour in particular as the material intermediary in relations between the subject and nature, and between the subject and other subjects. Tools are a special product of labour. Their specific feature is that, while the product of labour, a result of the labour process, they are at the same time involved in that labour process itself, entering it not simply as the product but in certain respects as the producer element. In the the scheme ´man-tool.-object of labour´ the middle link is that element of the labour process without which material production is inconceivable in human society. The sensory reflection of reality inherent in man´s animals ancestors preceded the origin of rational reflection in time. The latter while a higher stage of reflection, could not help being genetically linked with the first stage. But since a direct link between these two stages cannot be substantiated, and the thesis of the existence of a mediating representation is put forward, it must be assumed that the middle link, in order to perform its connecting role, has to be linked with both the sensory and rational <sensibilia-universal>. In that case the mediating representation must consequently contradictory, dual character. If it is taken as a subjective picture or reflection of objective events, then a determinant condition for its rise must have the development of an objective determinant perceived on the one hand at the sensory level, while sense perception, on the other hand, must already have been inadequate for a psychic reflection of its features, which went beyond the possibility of a direct sense perception. The objective determinant must also have a dual, contradictory character. The problem of the mediating representation is thus bases on the broader one of the origin of consciousness.

 

 

Before we can answer what is the mechanism of the transition from sense3 perception to abstract thought inherent in man as a formed rational being, we must discover the patterns of the natural, historical from direct sense reflection of reality by man´s animal ancestors to its mediated rational reflection in the head of Homo Sapiens. In particular, what is the relation between knowledge as understanding the content, structure, properties, and relations of the given object, and knowledge in the sense of ability to reproduce this object in human activity, including practical activity? This question, along with others, kept arising throughout the history of philosophical thought, and various trends and schools in philosophy endeavored to answer them. Contemplation of the structure of the cognitive relation leads to the conclus that it is specified by certain type of connection between the cognising man and the object cognised. Stating these points immediately gives rice to a number of questions; for instance, what is the object of knowledge and what is its nature? Can the cognising subject be the object of cognition himself, and if so, in what sense? How is it possible to know the object that is external relative to the subject and at the same time to be conscious of the subject himself as the focus of cognitive activity? And in general And in general what is “ I ”? Is it man´s body or something else? What are the modes of substantiating knowledge, the norms and standars which permit to distinguish between that which corresponds to reality and illusion or empty opinion? Do such norms and standards exist? If they do, in what are they substantiated, in their turn? Can unconscious knowledge exist, .i.e., the kind of knowledge where I don´t realise that I know something ? Does knowledge of something coincide with its understanding ? Finally, what are the mechanisms of the cognitive process? What is the actual interaction between the two terms of the cognitive relation, subject and object, if this interaction does exist at all, of course. It should be stated that for a long time all these all questions, which have been discussed in all their aspects since antiquity, were analyzed in philosophy, largely on the basis of studying the features of such systems of knowledge which were embodied, on the one hand, in everyday knowledge, and on the other, in philosophy itself as the first form of theoretical reasoning( some philosopher also included mythology among the systems of knowledge under analysis!)The epistemological cogitations of the scientist specialization in the particular areas of knowledge areas of knowledge were not typical then; they sometimes appeared irrelevant to what they did as professionals. Let us note merely that changes in the modes of theoretical reasoning and methods of coming different scientific theories in the wake of the scientific revolution at the beginning of the present century, substantively changed the attitude of workers in the special sciences to epistemological problems. There is literally not a single creator of any major scientific theory in our century, who would not endevour to provide an epistemological substantiation of his special scientific constructions, often raising in the process general questions about the nature of cognition, criteria of knowledge, etc. It is even said that the epistemological problem of the correlation between subject and object, which was for long time mostly of interest for philosophers, becomes at this time one of the cardinal problems of specialized scientific knowledge as well. This circumstance is largely due to the actually increased complexity of the relation of the scientific knowledge to the corresponding system of objects. The point is that any cognitive process assumes the use of certain mediators between the cognising subject and the cognised object.

In pre-scientific cognitive practice, this role was performed, first of all, by the labour implements, by all objects created by man for man and embodying certain socio-cultural values, that is the artificial environment, actully the whole of man-made ´second nature´; and finally various sign-symbolic systems ( in the firs place the natural language ) and various conceptual formations expressed in these systems and terms of these system. In science, added to this are, on the one hand, a system of devices and measuring instruments, and on the other, the totally of theories standing in certain relations to one another, which are expressed in artificial, specially constructed languages along with the natural language. In these days the system of such mediators in science has become so complicated and their relations to one another and to the object cognised so far from elementary that in some cases a special study is required to single out the objective domain of a theory and to ascertain its objective meaning. In the process, it becomes apparent that the choice of one type of mediators over another, it is not indifferent for the objective meaning of the knowledge obtained but essentially affects the singling out of certain aspects of the objective reality that is cognised. Because of this, man himself, as a being constructing apparatus and systems of theoretical knowledge, comes to the attention of specialists in those sciences which deal with nature rather than man. It was specially noticed, among other things, that the specific physical, psychical, and other traits of man as cognising being affect the nature of the research instrument used. It should be pointed out in this connection that objective interpretation of scientific knowledge and establishment of its objective meaning is not merely the product of idle philosophical curiosity, but a necessary element of scientific work, a condition of successful implementation of a given research programmer. The establishment of significant and essential element of the cognitive relation and the discovery of an intimate connection between epistemological contemplation and success in the special sciences have in some cases entailed certain losses of philosophical nature. The reasons for that are numerous, one of them being that some major scientists who tackle general philosophical problems, don´t always possess the necessary philosophical training and a knowledge of the scientific philosophy of dialectical materialism. The need for determining the place of the subject in the production of knowledge is sometimes idealistically interpreted as elimination of the distinction between subject and object, as the impossibility of conceiving of objective reality outside its realization. Many important and interesting epistemological deliberations of scientists need a through philosophical analysis for separating their rational meaning from idealistic irrelevancies. Well see a few instance of the discussion of the epistemological problem of the subject-object relation ship by specialist in the sciences. Thus, in studying the objects of classical physics one could either ignore the effect of the research instruments on them or take this effect into account in processing the information about the event under study. But in the methodology of quantum mechanics, physical objects are considered in their interaction with the measuring devices, which significantly affect the behavior of the objects of study. The mode of describing an individual quantum phenomenon is essentially dependent on the class of the measuring devices used for localizing this phenomenon in space time. Accordingly, the unambiguous account of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, include a description of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement. The result of interaction between an atomic object and a classically described device is the basic element constituting the subject-matter of physical theory. The prominent scientist Werner Heisenberg inferred from this circumstance that in quantum mechanics the distinction between the cognising subject and the cognised object is obliterated. (consult: Niels Bohr, “Quantum Physics and philosophy. Causality and Complementary”). Furthermore, the problems of substantiating mathematics, which became very acute in connection with the discovery of set-theoretical paradoxes early in this century, called to life one of the trends in the philosophy of mathematics-intuitionism, which offered a mode of handling the question of the permissible objects of mathematical discourse. In classical mathematics, the infinite is treated as actual or completed or extended or existential. An infinite set is regarded as completed totality, prior to or independently of any human process of generation or construction and as though it could be spread out completely for our inspection. The intuitionsnist mathematics, the infinite is treated only as potential or becoming or constructive. Intuitionists created new mathematics, including the theory of the continuum and set theory. This mathematics does not use actual infinity as an object of discourse. At the same time it contains concepts and rules that are in classical mathematics.

 

Intuitionism, a trend in the philosophical foundations of mathematics, along with logicism, formalism and effectivism, which arose in the early 1920s in connection with polemics over the theoretical principles of mathematics. According to intuitionism, the exact mathematical thought is bases on rational intuition which includes process of logical construction of all mathematical objects. Just as intuitionist, all mathematics is based on such intuition and, therefore, mathematical objects do not exist apart from their logical counterparts. To avoid paradoxes, mathematical proof must be based not on strict logic, but on the intuitive clarity; it is true if one intuitively understands its every stage, beginning from the points of departure and the rules of reasoning. That is why the applicability of logical laws and rules must be ultimately judged by intuition as well. But intuitionist as distinct from institutionalism does not oppose intuition to logic. Intuitionist believes that mathematics cannot rely on logic and develops its own understanding of logic as part of mathematics, viewing the logical theorems as mathematical theorems of the most general character. In the view of Mr. Heyting, there is for mathematics ´no other source than an intuition, which places its concepts and inferences before our eyes as immediately clear`. This intuition existing as it were before mathematical language and discursive logical reasoning, coincides at the same time with a specific activity of consciousness. And he remarks in passing: mathematics is more an activity than a theory. Activity, in its turn, coincides, in his view, with intuitive consciousness of time, so that the objects of mathematics exist only in human consciousness. The development of special scientific knowledge now spotlights other aspects of the problem of the relationship of the subject and the objective of cognitive activity. We refer here to the rapid growth of special sciences studying certain forms and mechanisms of the cognitive process. Psychology, undoubtedly, belongs among them. Psychological thinking goes back quite a few centuries, and psychology as an independent science based on experiment is at least a hundred years old. The concepts of subject, object, consciousness, sel-consciousness and others have long been fundamental in psychology. As a rule, psychologists borrowed their understanding of the fundamental significance the relation between subject and object and of the nature of the cognitive process from various philosophical conceptions. One of the distinctive features of modern psychology is an attempt at extensive experimental investigation of the cognitive process by the methods of the special sciences. Such branches of this science as the psychology of perception and the psychology of intelligence have obtained significant result in the last few decades. The so-called cognitive psychology commences to develop, which endeavors to take a new approach to the study of cognitive processes through studying their integration in complex structures formed in the framework of a definite cognitive task. The conception of the genesis of the mechanisms of cognitive activity worked out in detail by Jean Piaget has attracted considerable attention. Offering a theoretical interpretation of his experimental data, Piaget claims to have solved the basic epistemological problems. He studies various structures of which subject and object are component elements, and analyses the connections between intellectual and object related practical activity. Linguistics, ethnolinguists, cultural anthropologists, and psycholinguists still debate with some animation the Sapir Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity that gained wide currency in the late 1940s. The starting point of the hypothesis is that we cannot be fully conscious of reality without the help of language, the later being not only a secondary means of solution of some special problems of communication and thinking but also a mode of constructing our world. Noam Chomsky, author of the generative transformation model in linguistics, propounded a critique of the behaviorist, empiricist theory of language learning. Chomsky believes that this theory does not take into account account a number of important aspects of the language, such as the creative character of language using; the existence of an abstract generative structure of language ( “the deep structure”); the universal character of certain elements of language structure. To explain these aspects of language, Chomsky postulate the existence of certain fundamental psychological structures the subject´s innate ideas, consciously reviving certain elements of Cartesian epistemological conception. (See N. Chomsky:” Cartesian Linguistics”).

The rapid development of scientology as a special interdisciplinary area of study whose goal is investigation of science by the methods of the special sciences. Scientology studies not only the economic, sociological, socio-psychological, and communication aspects of scientific activity but also the process of production and transformation of scientific knowledge. There are beginnings of a rapprochement between Scientology and certain aspects of studies in the history of science. Of special interest in this connection is the book “ The structure of scientific revolutions”, by Thomas Kuhn, an North American specialist in the history of sciences, which met with considerable response. On the basis of theoretical analysis of extensive historical-scientific materials, the author discloses the important role for scientific research of the so-called paradigms, that is, theories accepted as model ones in the given scientific community at the given time along with their characteristic methods of specifying and solving scientist problems and modes of comprehending empirical facts. Kuhn places out special emphasis on the collective nature of scientific activity, pointing out that an individual scientist cannot be regarded as an adequate subject of scientific activity. Kuhn draws farreaching conclusions from his conceptions, mostly of epistemological and methodological nature. That is precisely the area where the untenability of certain elements of his history becomes particularly apparent.. In Kuhn´s view, there are no logical transitions between the separate paradigms ( he likens them to different, worlds in which researchers live ). The paradigms are incommensurable, which produce gaps between the various fundamental theoretical conceptions in science. Thus, certain aspects of Kuhn´s theory warrant relativist and subjectivist conclusions. We have cited here some examples of the modern special sciences of fundamental epistemological problems in the interpretation of knowledge and cognition and of the subject-object relation. It appears important and fruitful in this connection to compare the implications for general epistemology of the development of modern special sciences. The fact that art enhances our cognition of the world means that it has something in common with science. Despite all the differences which exist between those two forms of social consciousness, art like science telescopes the experience of the precipitous flow of life and broadens man´s horizons, giving him varied knowledge of men´s lives at different periods and in different countries, shedding light on the essence of phenomena taken from real life and singling out in the latter such aspects which remain beyond man´s grasps in the ordinary circumstances of his life experience. It has concern with Aesthetics, our subject-matter. Art is always revelation: even it comes familiar aspects of our everyday lives it can spotlight facets of life which enable us to see the familiar in the unfamiliar, and unfamiliar in the familiar. The subject and form of the knowledge of life acquired from art differ from the subject and form of such knowledge to be gleaned from science; this does not, however, imply that scientific knowledge, and knowledge attained through art are diametrically opposed to each other. It is difficult to accept the methodologically misleading premise of certain aestheticians to the effect that scientific objectivity and artistic objectivity move in opposite directions.

 

Art, unlike historical science, does not present us with historical facts in chronological order and does not always keep strictly to documented evidence; it does not formulate the laws underlying the historical events it treats. Yet historical science, in its turn, cannot shed light on the fate of a people through individual destinies in the way that art can, in the way that the fate of English society is brought home to us through the lives of Hamlet or Lear, or confront us with universal problems with the same impact as the plays of Shakespeare. In present age of world-wide homage to the power of science, it is particularly remarkable that leading scientists acknowledge the impossibility of reproducing a universal picture of the world through sciences alone, or indeed with the help of art alone. They supplement each other and are mutually indispensable. As stated above it follows that art and science provide two different forms of cognitive activity. Equally important to bear in mind is the fact that the transmission of knowledge is a vital and objective function of art. To overlook the cognitive significance

 

 

The Epistemological  Limits of the  Creative Interpretations

                                                    Walter du Halde

Epistemological analysis of art as gognition makes it imperative to examine its links and relations with the object of relations with the object of reflection,with the real world itself. The object of art is not the same thing as the subject of art. The subject of art is the external world perceived in the forms of human psychology. Thus, the definition has to parts; on the one side, objective reality, and on the other, the perception of it in certain forms. It is in binomial natural of this definition that its merit lies, for one-sided approaches to the question of art have led to the absolutisation of the importance of either the object or the artist. The history of art and literature shows that the subject of art is man in the system of his social relations, man in his social and natural environment . Science and technology have never directly determined the development of literature and the arts. They can only bring an indirect influence to bear on the development of culture, as, for example, in the case of cinema and television, for which new technology provided the material basis, the achievements of science, new techniques and new materials can be applied in the technical aspects of art. The achievements of science and technology may sharpen man´s senses and enrich his creative imagination. This is shown by the discovery of new intensities of colour combinations and the appearance of new unexpected associations in literature and art. Changing reality and conceptions of reality indirectly changes the forms in which it is portrayed and renews the structure of the imagination. New genres can take shape, the relationships between various forms of the art can change and new forms of art can arise. But the changes in man´s artistic concepts and sensibilities take place   considerably more slowly and in another than the changes in reality itself and in scientific conceptions of it. Man reacts to the changes in reality and in scientific conceptions of it as a social being, living in a certain environment and belonging to a particular class. The new achievements of science and technology are reflected in artistic thinking and emotions not directly, but through their role and importance in a social life. In many ways art is conditioned by a sphere which occupies an intermediary position between the   economic base and ideology, the sphere of social psychology. For reality appears before the artist not merely as the external world, but as a world experienced emotionally, and intellectually interpreted on this basis. Let us talk about Hegel´s words in respect of painting. It seemed to Hegel that there was a contradiction in the fact that the   greatest artists frequently, took man´s external surroundings for the subject of their paintings. In all these works of art, however, their real substance is not these objects themselves, but an individual artist´s vivacity and commitment, his emotions which   are reflected in the work and present not just a simple superficial copy of the objects but as the same time reveal his inner world.

 

Art concentrates and embodies is its images and forms social psychology and the direction of public sentiments. It helps to show the many faceted problems and requirements of the age. It is like a sensitive mirror which reflects social psychology and its development. The difficulty of examining the epistemological problems of art lies in the fact that they are the same time psychological problems. Judgment, though and truth appear in art in a emotionally coloured form. The unity of thought and emotion, of   the conscious and the subconscious, of the rational and the intuitive, permeates the whole structure of art: the artist´s apprehension of the world, the creative process and the consumer´s perception of the work of art. This in many ways explains the fact that to this day aesthetics lacks precise terminology: many of its definitions   are diffuse, and people continue to argue about the essence of beauty, that elusive and eternal phenomena of art. And indeed, what instrument can measure that emotion, that inspiration which   overcomes the artist in the process of creation, or that enjoyment and pleasure which the viewer or listener derives from contact with beauty ? The theory of information regards art as the sum of   certain items as colour, sound, word, etc., which with the help of various channels ( sight, hearing, touch ) serve as a means of communication between people, a means of conveying information. The types of communication of information differ according to various criteria: temporal, spatial, spatiotemporal, usual and unusual, i.e. bearing new information, etc. Through these types of communication information appears as quantitatively measurable. But the theory of information excludes the ideological and emotional element of art. Beauty is reduced in this theory to the structure of certain items of informations and artistic creation to the construction of certain types of communication. The emotional content and the individual, creative element of a work, the imagination and qualitative features of the work of art-all this is excluded by the theory from aesthetic analysis. The theory of information may be a useful subsidiary instrument of aesthetics, but it cannot claim to the modern aesthetic theory, because the sensual perception of the artist and viewer bears within itself not only quantitatively measurable information, but also its qualitative transformation an emotional evaluation and sensual characterization of the   real world. Art cannot be reduced to information because it poses questions before man, gives him enjoyment and affirms his emotional attitude to the world. It goes without saying that the artistic image is not a mirror reflection or photographic reproduction of the facts and phenomena of reality. Through observations and impressions, and with the help of this emotional memory, objective reality gives the artists material for the   creation of artistic imaginary. The artistic transforms the   material taken from life in accordance with his class world-outlook and understanding of the laws governing objective reality. Art finds its subject in the   character and essence of the concrete process of man´s interaction with the external world. This   interaction manifests itself in various forms, which are expressed in aesthetics in the categories of the beautiful, the sublime, the heroic, the tragic, the comic, and so on, either separately or synthesized. The basis aesthetic categories represent a theoretical interpretation and generalization of the character of man´s interaction with the real world. But they also reveal the sources of the meaningfulness of art. And, consequently, if the usual cognitive image is the reflection of the object as such, then the artistic image is the result of man´s evaluative cognition of existence, of his subjective perception and appraisal of the object. In other words, the object of cognition by science and art is the, the external world, but their subjects of cognition and assimilation are different.

 

In art cognition is a process which exposes not the natural laws and links of phenomena, but the meaning of these   phenomena for man. Science attempts to comprehend the essence of phenomena, regardless of man´s subjective attitude of them. Art reveals the link between man and essence   of a phenomenon. It is also important to bear in mind certain epistemological differences in the content of the art and science. Whereas the content of science is objective truth, art has a twofold cognitive content: knowledge of the axiological aspects of existence, and the artist´s self knowledge, which expresses both his personal and social system of evaluations of real world. Art is characterized. Art is characterized by the dialectic of cognition and evaluation of the real world. The difference between scientific and artistic cognition lies not only in the   subject of cognition, but also in the mode of cognitive and assimilating reality. While the form of cognition of   science is abstract and logical, that of art is concrete and figurative. Scientific thought operates in logical categories as concept's, judgments, conclusions, etc., While art reproduces reality in artistic images which are distinguished by their vital immediacy, their sensual concreteness and their direct affect on man´s senses, on this sight and hearing. At the same time, the artistic is not simply contemplation, but an artistic generalization, penetrating the essence of things and revealing the deeper meaning in the   events of life. The artistic image is a dialectical fusion of vital contemplation and abstract though, given in a concrete-sensual, aesthetically expressive form. The very firs and most familiar to us is sensation, in it there is inevitably also quality. At the sensation stage generalization takes the form of likening, which is   characterized on the hand by the fact that generalization takes place according to an emphatic quality, and on the other by the fact that choice and limitation in sensation are carried out according to the principle of what is more interesting and desirable in man´s life activities and requirements. This testifies to the fact that already in sensations the elementary, unconscious selection is essential, since it is through it that what is necessary to man is determined. At the same time, generalization or likening´s at the level of sensations are not only primary figurative, but also signaling, non-figurative abstract phenomena, which express a general external quality, no yet isolated from the individual object, but already representing the elementary generalization of man´s social experience, including the experience of processing colour and sound signals from external world. To discover the objective prerequisites for artistic generalization, it is very important to bear in mind many features of generalization at the stage of perception, above all the principle of development, which is characterized by dynamic formation of the image, by temporal consistency, emotions and the synthesis of separate parts linked by a common essence. The role and character of generalization in the process of perception is so fundamentals that many researchers, above all psychologists, have introduced the concept of productive perception by analogy with productive thinking. Under this approach, the problem of the formation of an image of a given object is complemented with the problem of the birth of the image of a new object. Study is devoted to characterizing not only the perception of a form, but also the seeing of the new form, .i.e to the process of image-forming in perception.

 

In the birth of new image, a particularly important contribution is made man´s optic system. This contribution is not restricted to the reproduction of reality. The optic system carries out very important productive functions. And such concepts as visual thinking or pictorial imagination are by no means metaphors. Psychological investigation of the activities of the optic system show that the process of perception includes the discovery and isolation of pieces of   information, which correspond to the aims of the activities, the inspection of the isolated information, and the actual construction of an image. The most important qualities of perception are the ability to rebuild perceptive images and models of the external world and the ability to change ways of constructing and identifying them. One and   the same object can serve as a prototype for many perceptive images. Generalizations at the level of the   idea have a creative character and are those observations of life which serve as the basis of the firs step in the realization of the artist´s creative intension. Already at this stage the evaluative aesthetic attitude appears as a specific feature of the artistic image: the idea acts as a link between the artist´s social experience and the cognizant   phenomenon of reality. The stages of abstract, conceptual generalization are characterized by transformative   activity, in the course of which the change of the signal-image into the signal-thought is qualitatively new step in the process of cognition, resolving the contradictory unity of the general and the general and the particular in the universal. Conceptual generalization is characterized by the further limitations of the data received from reality; this is know in psychology as the funnel principle, and leads to the selection of the most essential content for conceptual thinking and scientific theories. Art makes use of that remnant of concrete-sensual images which   has been isolated by   conceptual thinking, that remainder which because of its immediacy cannot become an abstract concept and which forms the basis of a second language. The above scheme of the process of characterization is provisional in character: it is divided into steps, whereas, as is generally known, human cognition is marked by its integrity and by the mutual penetration of the sensual and the rational. Activity in art is connected not with a passive, reflecting personality but   with creative personality, whose activity is determined, on the one hand, by the process of cognition and the level of accumulated knowledge, and, on the other, by the productive ability of the artist´s creative imagination.                          

 

 

                                                           The cultural Process    

                                              Walter du Halde

As with the development of science, the progress of art is inconceivable without a critical mastering of the artistic experience, creative traditions and aesthetics standards of the past: (through this statement we can find the Hegel´s original sin; the law of historical process and continuity in art was the hiding place were Hegel its ensnare and formulates its famous theory “ The Death of Art). However, continuity in the development of art differs in a number of essential ways from continuity in science, and this is due primarily to the very essence of art as cognition of the world in artistic images. Consequently, the problem of cultural heritage in art acquires one more vitally important aspect. What are the specific and most essential features of continuity in the development of art? Because science and art reflect various aspects of the material world differently and are correlated with social being and human practice, we believe that features lie mainly in the fact that science, as a conceptual method of reflecting reality, gives priority in its development to continuity in content, while art, as a method of cognizance the world in artistic images, gives priority to continuity in form. In the sphere of scientific knowledge this specific feature of continuity manifest itself most vividly in mathematics where continuity is even more important than in the other natural and technical sciences. The significance of continuity in mathematics can be explained by the fact that it is epistemologically connected with the multi-stage process of abstraction, wide-scale usage of the axiomatic method and the ability of mathematical theories to reflect not only the spatial forms and quantitative relations of the material world, but also ideal objects. A mathematician does not have to conduct any experiments or to be directly involved in the study of various material objects, being involved in such activities, he no longer acts as a mathematician, but as a physicist, a cybernetist, a biologist, engineer, etc.. He always deals with existing scientific material, building his generalizations and new axioms on the basis of the available theories and proven theorems. Continuity also plays a very important role in other natural and technical sciences, although in this respect there may be no comparison between them and mathematics, and again the significance of continuity is confined mainly to their content. In contrast to science, in art continuity acquires special significance with respect to the artistic form. This certainly does not imply that art has no continuity in content. The eternal problems of art: love and hatred, friendship and animosity, the idea of personal vocation, one´s duty to society, etc. have always aroused an emotional response in people and will always do so in the future. The art of each ways do so in the future. The art of epoch resolves these problems in its own way, but they always reemerge before the next generation, requiring a fresh artistic interpretation. However, whereas science is marked by continuity of concepts, laws, categories, formulas, rules, etc., irrespective of forms they have acquired, in its development art inherits not only the ideas, creative principles and aesthetic standards, but also the works of art as a whole.

In examining the process of historical continuity in art, we cannot rely exclusively on the content of one or another work of art, neglecting its form. No matter how critical we may be in evaluating a work of art, the ideas of a writer, artist, composer, etc., we always receive them in all their individual singularity, their artistic uniqueness, in which the form and the content are inseparable. We can noted another significant feature of the development of art as distinct from the development of science, is that the continuity plays an essentially different role in it. Whereas each epoch-making scientific discovery leads to a thorough revision of the concepts which have hitherto dominated a science, whereas major revolutionary upheaval in science turns the whole previous body of knowledge into material of purely historical interest, with the reservation that their rational content and the grains of absolute truth the contain are incorporated into the qualitatively new knowledge, genuine masterpieces of art live on eternally. It goes without saying that in the process of social development both the content and the methods of artistic creativity have to undergo various changes; yet, once created, a work of art never loses its aesthetic value and, consequently, its cognitive significance throughout centuries. The work of true artists preserve their freshness and perpetual youth eternally. Obviously, this feature distinguishing art from science and from the other forms of social consciousness is just another manifestation of its essence as an image-bearing reflection of reality. Reflecting through artistic images the life of the people, the historical objectives of the epoch, etc., art, provided we deal with genuine art, is invariably based on universal principles and, therefore, while it is limited by the historical conditions of its epoch, it is not limited in term of time, since the nation is immortal, social progress develops in conformity with certain laws, and the course of history as a whole is irreversible. Another essential feature of continuity in the development of art consists in the fact that there is no place here for any abrupt changes, such as technological or scientific revolutions, which cancel settled tradition. In general, a new discovery in art does not nullify values accumulated hitherto. In the process of social development, the works of art which were created in certain historical epochs are linked up with the new generation of people; they bring out certain previously unknown facets and possibilities, acquire new interpretations and thus fully reveal their inexhaustible riches.

Thoughtless of all radical changes in art, its principal means has invariably been an artistic image combining the typical and the individually inimitable in life. It is true that the history of art has seen certain innovators, who sought to create a new art through destroying its image-bearing character. Yet, by destroying this, these revolutionist of art have in practice destroying his own art. First and foremost, genuine innovation in artistic creativity finds its expression in the ideological content, and only then in form, and this change is never so rapid as in science. In addition to these distinctions common to all socio-economic formations, the development of art and science has its own specific peculiarities characteristic of the process of continuity in antagonistic class society. In that society continuity in the sphere of art is susceptible to the influence of the class struggle to a mush greater degree than in the sphere of the natural sciences. This is due to the fact that art, unlike the natural and technical science show greater independence with respect to the social being and the economic relations dominating society. Here in change in socio economic formation does not annul the achievements of the preceding years. The experience gained by the natural and technical sciences has served all socio-economic formations and can be successfully utilized by any class. The development of art is strictly specific and has much in common with development of the social sciences which, as we have already seen, are also characterized by continuity. However, insofar as their development hinges on the class interests of particular social groups, this continuity tends to be confined to a very narrow framework and to assume extremely contradictory forms. As an ideological form of social consciousness, art is directly linked with the class interests of certain social forces and is actively involved in the ideological struggle. This explains the limited and contradictory nature of continuity in art as well as in the social sciences. In refracting social life through the prism of class struggle, the artist is always tackling certain social problems and participating in the social movements of his age in accord with his understanding of these problems; in this sense his creativity is to a lesser or greater degree always partisan. The difference in the link connecting art and the natural sciences with social life and class relationships leaves its mark on the very character of the activities of the scientist and the artist: the link between the natural scientist and the class struggle is largely indirect, while in art this link is generally direct. And this cannot but influence the continuity processes and art impart to them various specific nuances. These are, the most essential features which distinguish the process of continuity in the development of art from that in the development of sciences. However, this analysis would be incomplete if we did not draw attention to the fact that these distinctions are not absolute, and that it would be wrong to set them against each other, just as each other, just as it would be wrong to draw an absolute distinction between science and art. The image-bearing artistic and logical scientific form of reflection of the material world are not separated by some insuperable barrier. On the contrary, they are inseparably linked together in the integral process of cognition and practical activity. Genuine art has always been addressed to Man, reflected his aspirations, joys and sorrows and illuminated his road to Happiness. This explains the existence of the so called eternal themes of art, such as Truth, Love, Justice, etc.. In eulogizing the emotions that elevate Man, art has not only been establishing the ideals of Beauty, but also summoning men to the struggle to transform the world according to the laws of beauty; it not only glorified Man, but also demanded that the inhuman order dominating in the old world be replaced by genuinely humane standards of Good and Harmony. You can find the essence of the thesis of popular character of art. This understanding of art´s social role in the life of the people, and the artist´s conscious attitude toward his functions as an individual actively participating together with his people in building a new world. Realism emerged together with art fully corresponds to its nature. This is why realism has invariably represented the general line of the development of the entire world art, despite occasional improper remark. Suffice it to recall the genesis of art in pre-class society, where rock drawings and primitive rhythms reflected labor processes and household relations, on the hard road realism had to cover under the conditions of antagonistic socio-economic formations, overcoming all sort of obstacles, particularly religious, on its way toward its unprecedented achievements, first, in the antique world and, later on, in the era of Renaissance.

The entire history of world art attest to the fact that realism has unlimited latent potential for progress. Realism is not merely a form of creativity, but epitomizes its genuine essence. In reflecting life, realism is not a confined to merely copying reality, but constantly finds some new aspect within it, calls for this new aspect to be developed and, in the process of its own development, seeks to find new, more consummate forms for the expression of the developing content. By seeking to express first and foremost human, realism has been developing throughout different historical epochs in close connection with the struggle for social progress, therefore, it is not surprising that, in the era of early bourgeois revolutions, it above all in the form of critical realism, permeated the entire development of art. In its struggle against various attempts, to set against it certain anti-realistic trends, realism in our time has become the banner of a new one. Today, having assumed the form of socialist realism, it represents a new stage in mankind´s artistic culture. After much troubles, the realism in the epoch of socialism began, as a method of creativity in art, fruitful and powerful, with unlimited diversity of forms and individual styles chosen by artists according to their particular subjects and creative search, their, tastes and aspirations. Hence, this realism does negate but further develops all the achievements of art in the proceeding ages. The development of art is a dialectical process: it is inconceivable without continuous renovation, without unending transformation of content and form, while latter, in turn, are inconceivable without continuity in the aesthetic and creative means which have accumulated the artistic experience of mankind, i.e., without a solid tradition. Besides an understanding of the dialectical interdependence of tradition and their dialectical assimilation, it would be impossibly to evaluate correctly the significance of artistic heritage for the new generations and, consequently, to understand the development of new art. The failure to understand the interdependence of tradition and innovation is the result of an anti-dialectical view of the correlation of content and form in art, the result of metaphysical neglect of the relative independence of artistic form, underestimation of the significance of the old forms for the development of the new content, and of the significance of artistic tradition at each stage of development of art in the productive search for more consummate forms of artistic creativity. In the process of the of the onward development of art, traditions which have been model over considerable period of time, sometimes over centuries, make up a complex of relatively stable qualities which influence the consciousness and emotions of people by virtue of their stability. The force of this influence is directly proportional to the evidence in the artistic tradition of tendencies close to the people, their life and struggle, although, of course, the disappearance of this link with popular life does not cause the traditions to disappear overnight. They continue to exist and influence the new mode of being. Nonetheless, those defunct traditions, which have to be preserved in museums and archives, do not have principal significance for the development of art in each concrete historical epoch. These is a great difference between artistic tradition and adherence to tradition by a particular artist. The latter rigidly confines the artist to habitual, stable and, consequently, inflexible creative techniques which dead for the new epoch, while tradition enables him to develop a mere profound insight into the world, art and his creativity, and to see the life in its dynamism. A traditional artist belongs, figuratively speaking, to the domain of the museum. He may be extremely sincere and have a brilliant drawing technique, yet he is completely oblivious of the essence of art: the living pulse of life. Let us try to compare his creativity with the creativity of innovative artist. Throwing aside the bonds of traditionally they develop the tradition of dynamic, realistic art. In this lies their revolutionary strength and the genuine greatness of their creativity. And it is for this specific reason that the products of their creativity themselves become classics.

It goes without saying that in this case the historical tradition, no matter in what distant centuries it emerged, is subject to modifications in compliance with the requirements of the new historical epoch and acquires certain new features and properties. Tradition is extremely powerful and plays a progressive role in the development of art when never its action is determined by a correspondence between the particular historical tradition and progressive tendencies in the development of art, when never it facilitates the solution of the urgent problems confronting art. What does following a tradition imply in art? Mainly, it implies developing progressive trends which were available in the content of the art of the preceding epoch without copying the forms of art, including nationals ones, but applying them to meet the new demands of social life, discarding all that does not agree with new artistic criteria, and utilizing and creatively developing all the riches of artistic heritage which have not lost their emotional power under new conditions. An artist will make a correct critical choice and will manage to separate the decayed and the viable phenomena in the artistic heritage only if he stands on the native soil of his people, if his life is inseparable from the life of his people, and if he is participating in his people´s struggle for a better future. In such a situation, reality itself will prompt him as to what is to be included in is inventory from the old arsenal of art, and how the old arms ought to be used to avoid a conflict with the epoch.

                                      Interaction between science  and  art

                                                      Walter du Halde

 

The scientific and technological revolution has exerted a tremendous influence  on all forms of  activity and consciousness, and their interrelations, and  their  interrelations. Today it is impossible to comprehend  the entire  range of  changes that  have occurred, although it is clear  that  they  are  of  utmost  importance. The  problems  of  the interaction  between science  and  art is a philosophical one, not one  of natural science, and the  results of past  debates  do not  remove  the  necessity of  solving the  continuous  streams of  new conceptual problems  fact  the  researcher. Axioms  in  philosophy don´t exist  as  they  do  in  mathematics.  For  that  reason  it  is  hardly conceivable  that  later experience  ads nothing to  the  understanding  of  past  arguments. Today it is that  we  again turn  to  those  arguments to better understand at least one  aspect  of  the   problem under  investigation.  While  that has been discussed  previously, that  main emphasis  was not  on  the  interaction, but  on explaining haw science affects that artist and  how  art  influences the  scientist, who, in in a manner of speaking, is also  an artist, pointing out the  science  and  art  are both the  results of the  creative process. Therefore, it is necessary  to empathize that  scope of the  problems connected with this interaction depends on the  social  and  cultural  environment  in which it exist and is  discussed. Looking to  the past, we can see that science  and art have  not been fields of man´s since  the  creation  of  the  world. They developed in a definite social and cultural atmosphere. It would be ridiculous to conceive of a  direct  correlation between science  and  art  which   excludes the  influence of man,  society and  culture. Moreover, the  controversies  themselves are determined by the  level in a given socio-cultural unit, which is  why an analysis of those  arguments can given  the  researcher material  for understanding the  direction of  social  development. The scientific and  technological  revolution  has had effect on all spheres of human activity, including  the  aesthetic. Today however, there  is  a  tendency  to  absolutist  the significance of this revolution and to explain many processes by its  direct influence  on social mentality, independent  of  the social conditions. For that reason, it is  methodologically important  for  the present  to  show  the  connection  between  those  changes  in  social  consciousness.

 

As science and technology develop in an  antagonistic class society, it  becomes  clear that  their progress has dual, contradictory  character,  and his progress sometimes leads to  a  deterioration of  aesthetic  standard of man´s way  of   life  and  his environment. Under  progressive  society the  results  are  on the  contrary, they  serve  the  benefit. The scientific and technological revolution aggravates, rather   than lessens the contradiction in the class society. Despite the frequent talk of the  need to change  the present orientation and aims of science and technology,  basing them on aesthetic principles, we see that the class society, torn  by social contradictions, is not capable of taking advantage of the  opportunities offered. This results in disillusionment and eve the belief  that aesthetic achievements are impossible in our society, and are, to  a significant degree, at odds with it. Hence the  call for a complete  rejection  of science  and  for  a “back to nature” movement. However,  modern legends about “demon technology” are  nothing more than a way of  camouflaging class society´s  unavoidable conflicts. One vitally important  problem is establishing closer ties between science and  art, and using them harmoniously for the perfection of man´s  personality. A new society, inclusive  class society, but  progressive,  creates the  prerequisites for using recent advances  for humanistic aims, introducing aesthetic principles into our daily live  and  transforming the world in accordance with the laws of beauty. Science and  art, which  originated from  a one-time united, syncretic way of comprehending the  world, expressed in mythology, subsequently found themselves in complex, sometimes conflicting relations. During  the industrial revolution, the  fear  of  rational  science  which looked at the world  in terms of pure logic led  many men in the  arts ( the Romantics, e.g.) to think  that  the  impeding rule  of  scientific consciousness would mean the  end of art. Several thinkers tried to give  those  fears a philosophical interpretation, announcing that  the  epoch of art,  part of humanity´s childhood, was irretrievably lost having given  way  to the  epoch of labour and science, and that in the new age, the  task  was to perceive  art scientifically rather than revive artistic creativity.

 

An important result of the  development of science and  technology was  the  understanding  that science cannot develop at the  expense of art, and  vice versa.   Pessimistic  prognoses to the  effect  that  art  would  be  forced out by science  were  not confirmed. Another problem of a completely  different  nature  arose- that  of the isolation of both science and  art  which, according to some philosophers, could lead to the formation of  two independent cultures, the scientific and the  artistic. But  perhaps  that tendency in science and  art is variation of the human personality´s  self-alienation in class society? Maybe the philosophers are exaggerating here? Or, perhaps, that  which at firs glance  seems a divergence,  is in reality nothing more that the outward manifestation of a new relationship between science and  art?  There exists  the opinion that  science  busies itself with searching  for the  classifying that which has  not  yet been discovered but exist  in nature. In that sense, supposedly, it differs from artistic activity, which is first and  foremost creative. In reality, we observe  a radically  different correlation between scientific and  artistic  thought. For science, as art, reflects and  perceive  the world creatively, relying on the  creative  capacities of the human mind.  In connection  with this, an interesting question arises: how does  natural science, in the form of a model, influence non-natural scientific thought, aesthetic thinking for  example? This question is  of  a special  interest since  it  raises before  the  researcher  the important problem of  the relation between science and  culture, and  discusses the processes  thanks to which scientific ideas  are  popularized and  culturalized. The  influence of culture  on the  development of scientific ideas  important aspect of the  present-day controversy between the externalist and  internalist,  concerning what the  growth of science is based  upon. The  externalist  see  the reason for  scientific progress in the  influence  of external factors, including aesthetic ones, while the internalist claim the it develops strictly in  accordance  with its own  natural laws, inherent in the  evolution of scientific knowledge. The  question of contemporary social progress is that of the  development of the  creative  capacities of the  direct  participants in the  production process, and  of the  shift  in the  gravitational  center of human  activity from  executive functions to  creative ones.  History  has  shown us that  it  is precisely in art art  that  free, creative  individuality took shape and  asserted itself and  for  this  reason, art came  forth  as  that form  of activity  and  cognition which stimulated the creative potentials  of the  individual who devoted himself to it. Consequently, it is possible to  say that, while  intersecting with science  at the very point of its  conceptions ( the act of creation ), art, in its finished products ( as opposed to the forms  in which the results of scientific research  are embodied) bears the  imprint of the  creator´s individuality, allowing man  to co-experience the  creative process; it´s to says art can occupy a special  place  in the  development  of the  creative  potential of  a society, stimulating the formation  of  forward-looking men of science and  social  progress. We  have in mind not  so much the utilization of art  by science  and technology or its transformation into a subsidiary  instruments of scientific and technological progress, but firs  and  foremost, the formation of creative, harmoniously  developed individual.

 

Scientific progress should be viewed  as an  ambivalent phenomenon not  only  regards to man,  nature  and  society, but in regards to art as  well. While  it utilizes  art for  its  own  purposes, and technological progress  also  offers  art new possibilities.  The  technical means resulting  from scientific advances not  only facilitate the  mass spreading of art, but, paradoxical as it may  seem, help to overcome  standardization  and  encourage  the  orientation of  production towards local  subcultures  and  the  individual. The  amount of  socially necessary labour-time is lessened, which means more  free time;  time  in which art  as a form of human activity is  bound  to  occupy a dominant place. The will be  art  in its historically established forms and  types, and at the same  time, art which coincides with the creation of the very forms of human interaction. The growth of  science  and  technology´s significance, and  the  development of new forms and means of communication and new  types of artistic interpretation of reality as television,  movie, design, has led many theoreticians to  the conclusion that art, in assimilating this ideas is changing not only its forms, butt also its content, becoming more intellectualized and losing its ideological content. As a result of these distorted ideas, art is treated as a technical device, remember the innumerable forms modernism, which proclaim their closeness to discoveries in modern physics and, in particular, to the research into the  molecular-atomic structure of matter, or as a precise mechanical reproduction of fragments of   reality (hyper-realism). Such approaches are  supposedly dictated by modern science and technology; other aestheticians, philosophers and  art  sociologist must present well  thought out arguments proving the  unsoundness of such views on art  and  confirming art´s social  essence and  class functions. They have  to explain the forms  of  aesthetic perception of a new standpoint. It is  from dialectical materialism angle that we should  examine the problem  of art´s significance, specially when science´s  status  in capitalist  society do not  give a scientist, working in a large  group on  only  part  of the problem, the  opportunity to see end  result  of his scientific activities. The  question of  the  scientist´s responsibility  has  taken  on new poignancy. Today  there  is  a  definite  demarcation  occurring  between  romantic  anti intellectualism who  shun  natural science  on the  grounds  that scientific discoveries  in one  field  or  another  could be  used to the  detriment of  man, and  the  critical  rationalist who contend  that  man  can understand  the  character  of  the danger threatening him and  find the  means  to  overcome  them  only with the help of science. However, neither  faction always  sees  the  social, class  roots of many dangerous social phenomena. In order to overcome these dangers, the discussion should  include no only theoretical criticism, but revolutionary critical practices. Art can  serve  as  an  important tool in restoring and  even reviving the  unity of  moral values  and  the cognition process in science.  Art  will  be able to act as a kind  of  moral regulator, reflecting  the society´s attitude  to  the  scientific´s research, allowing the  scientist t to  step back  and  evaluate the overall  significance of  his  work, and  helping  society understand  the contemporary world  in  which  has  such  a  major  influence. Nowadays today, as  usual, in  speaking of  the  interaction of  science  and  art, we  should always keep in  mind the  specific characteristics  the  field of  action, where  the  interaction of  science  and  art takes place. Thanks to  the  change in  social conditions, the  prerequisites for  for  a  complex, dialectical and  deep-rooted unity of  science and  art, a major  factor  in  the  formation  of  an  all  round, creatively developed man, arise in  a  new  society. The system of  mass communications, bases on such technical means television, film and radio, has made  dramatic progress in the  last  few decades  and  in many ways has determined the  face of modern culture. On the  one  hand, it  has promoted the  democratization of culture and  made  complex  and  unique cultural phenomena, accessible to the masses, considerably raising the  overall cultural level of the people. But on other hand, mass editions of unique cultural phenomena, which are, figuratively speaking, and  adapted  translation of a complex  cultural processes into  the  vernacular of  mass  communication, often lead  to the  simplification and  vulgarization of those processes.

 

Under certain social  conditions, substitutes  for  real  culture  and  in the so called kitsch. Thus, along with many positive  developments, has  fostered the appearance  of  certain  negative  trends, too. In the  last few  years  many  have  written  of the  strong  tendencies among the broadest  sections of the  population, toward a purely consumer attitude towards a  cult  of  things,  which  have  become  the  main source of  enjoyment, toward the  simplification of  spiritual  and  aesthetics needs and their reduction  to a  minimum, and  finally toward a dehumanization and  even destruction  of  culture. All those tendencies  have  found  full  expression in modern art, and particularly  in  those complex and  often dead-end trends  through  which  art tries  to find new  forms, new  content and  new  aspects of  its existence in society. However, the  researcher would do wrong to only concentrate on negative in  culture. Well examine several  positive aspects of  the influence of  technological progress on artistic culture. Scientific research has shown  that  radio, cinema, television and  particularly computers system with universal spider´s web-Internet influences influence  the  emotional-affective aspects of the human psychology and  not  the  intellectual ones. They are not passive carriers of  information (as traditional painting or literature ) but actively manipulate consciousness. Becoming accustomed to receiving basic information via these forms of communication leads to the lowering of man´s active perception  and lessens his ability to think for himself and to perceive  art creatively. To that list we should ad the recordings of audio visual information about past events, the possibility of almost immediate  telephone connections with practically any point on earth, the increase in the speeds travels, the substantial reduction in labour time. As a result, 20th century man found himself in a difficult situation which is characteristic of any transitional period in the history of culture. He  is brought up on many cultural and  artistic traditions of  the  past, but at the  same time, is  strongly influenced by the achievements of modern society,  which as  a rule, don´t harmonize well with traditional cultural values. The changes occurring in modern man´s sense perceptions under  the influence  of a technically equipped  society prevent him fully appreciating cultural values of the  past  and  evaluate many  aspects of those cultures in his eyes. Technological progress does  do mush to hamper  modern man´s perception of classical (in the broad  sense of the term ) forms of art, whether we like it  or not. But what  do today´s people in the  art think of it? The  majority of  them, in  contrast to  the  young man,  were  raised in the traditions of pre technological culture and  owing to  their professional training,  known, feel  and understand art of the  past, frequently using it as  a source of  inspiration in their own creative work. An  analysis of the various  genres of contemporary art shows that  it has developed along very different lines as compared to  European art of the last centuries, and here technological progress plays an important role.  Sculpture and painting exhibit a tendency to ignore the representational principle: music is revising its fundamental precepts  of melody and harmony,  and architecture seeks  new  methods and forms far removed from traditional ones. One of the traditional criteria for appraising the aesthetic significance of work of  art as non utilitarian objects of contemplation affording spiritual delight to the  subject perceiving them ( the recipient),  is now disputed  by many artists and critics, though its ( the  criterion´s ) basic principle of oppositional organization of the artistic text is inherent not only in classical art, but in an even sharper  form in the new art.

 

The erosion of the boundaries of traditional art forms, characteristic of our century, promotes their and opens up possibilities for their synthesis. These new possibilities are  actively being used by designers, architects, city planners and  film directors  in their work. The modern art  are not  only being drawn to one another, but also to nature. If we now turn forms widespread and know as pop culture, particularly the young, we see that they use all the kinds and forms of  art characteristic of our time, but adapt them for a large specific  auditorium. The psychology of perception and tastes of a particular groups of the population are scientifically analyzed with recurse to modern sociology, psychology and physiology, or the audio visual forms  most effective in exciting ´s the psyche are chosen.  Then, on the basis  of those findings, works are  created  which the  great majority of people  for whom they were designed like for  a period of time. In this  way the  creators of pop culture, with the help on scientific  and empirical methods of research, ascertain some of the  elementary artistic some of the  elementary artistic and quasi-artistic structures which  have strongest effect on a relatively broad section of the population. An analysis  of  modern mass and  elitist art, which in the past  few years has drawn closer to mass art, at the  expense of  lowering its  spiritual content, shows us one more  interesting tendency in contemporary artistic culture. The creators of new art  forms  are  trying to destroy the  boundaries which have  traditionally separated  art  from non-art, and works from reality and  the viewer. Man-made and  natural objects are removed  from their usual sphere of  functioning and designated  as works of  art: works are specially created  so  that there can be active participation  on the  part of the viewer,  whom the author tries  to  involve  in is  action work – often such  works exist only in the process  of creation, or the  creative art -  We see this  tendency in “ happenings “ and  similar  act, taking place in the  open and intended for improvisation and participation of all who desire to do so.

 

The characteristic features of  the  development of  modern  artistic,  called forth to a large extent by  scientific progress as follows:

a) A change in  modern man´s perceptions;

b) A movement  toward orienting basic forms of  artistic culture and in particular, pop culture, on     

    psychology and  controlling it, resulting in the lowering of  art´s spiritual content;

c) A tendency in the modern arts to  use  the lasted technological achievements an to create new

    artistic languages, based  on a synthesis of  the  representational and expressive means of 

    traditional art.

d)  A effort to break down the  boundaries between art and non-art.

e) A  tendency toward the  union of  works of art with art with nature.

All these distinctive  features, discernible already in the first  third in  this  century, brought the  problem  of an aesthetically pleasing environment to the  foreground; to put it more exactly, the  problem of  creating an environment for man which would harmoniously combine functional and  utilitarian principles with artistic and  aesthetic ones. The more successful reached in countries under  Byzantine influence. Here we talking about Orthodox churches. With the help  of a fairly organic synthesis of many medieval art forms, united by the  religious act, a specific aesthetic environment was created in  Eastern Orthodox churches in  the late Middle Ages. When  a man  entered  one,  he left the familiar every-day world  behind and  became immersed in the  religious act, whose main purpose was  to worship and  glorify god, and  to reach a mystical communion. The idea  of  the  divine nature of creation made up the  spiritual center of the of the church environment and  lay  at  the  heart of the temple´s synthesis of art the arts. Another more recent example is the landscape gardering which flourished in Europe in the  18th and 19th centuries was designed for creating splendid surroundings for the aristocracy. The  situation is  completely different in  modern cultures: as  a rule, it doest´t attempt to  bind man  to a divinity which is beyond his understanding, nor is it centered on the  refined tasted of a  select public. Its aims are modest and  realistic: to create an environment in  which it  will be  comfortable and pleasant for  man  to  live, study, work and  spend his leisure time. We  can break down the basic types of  environment into  residential, educational, industrial and recreational. These, in turn,  are  made up of various mini-environments; centers of  art and  cultures have a  place of  their own in this subdivision. Twentieth century man began to  recognize that artistic and  aesthetic sphere exist not simply to  provide  a  pleasant pastime for elite snobs but is a necessary  component  in human life. When elements of aesthetic  activity and perception are  organically interwoven in all aspects and forms of  human life and activity, they do not only beatify them, but  transform them  them into higher and  more  effective forms.

 

Nevertheless those  positive  effects  are  only possible  when the environment is  designed on  the  basis of a  correct conception of man. If it  is created with the thought that man  is a creature  interested only in satisfying his sensual and consumer instincts and egoistic desires, as is frequently observed  in modern culture, then it is doubtful the  such n environment will improve man and  promote cultural progress. It isn´t difficult to notice that in the end of this century almost all forms of art have been incorporated into the organization  of aesthetically pleasing surroundings for man, and a new kind of art has arisen, including a variety of object spatial arts, whose main goal is to organize man´s environment in all its diversity of form. (By environment we mean, in this case, man´s physical, spatial, audio-visual surroundings.). It is made up a combination of man-made elements, situated, as a rule, inside architectural structures, and  natural surroundings which  are in some measure or other, regulated by man  and united with a man-made environment. One of the problems for modern architects and designers is  to succeed, with the help of technical, artistic and  aesthetic means, by combining man-made and natural components; an specially rich diversity of form, methods and imagination is required in building recreation areas. It is here that the aesthetisation of the environment, based on  a combination of natural surroundings, technical structures and devices and elements of many kinds of contemporary art, begins to take shape. 

 

Art, Culture and  Aesthetics Education

Every form of spiritual creativity has a distinct specificity and distinct cultural functions, occupying a definite position in the life of man and sociaty. The life of art in the system of culture is also specific in this sense. To establish laws goberning the being of art in the sphere of culture, its interaction with other kinds of human activity, and its intersecting links with others forms of nonmaterial production, it is necessary to study the special channels and forms of art´s influence on social psychology, to study the different spheres of spiritual and practical, communication, and creativity. Types of interaction between art and non-artistic forms of culture cannot be represented as invariants. The ambivalence of the possibilities of art at each historical stage is determined both by intra-artistic processes and the demands of socio cultural situations. Coincidence of the direction of intra artistic and socio cultural development stimulates creative discoveries in art and makes possible productive influence of art on spiritual life and other forms of consciousness. Neglect for the laws and the specificity of art and imposition of purely auxiliary functions on it reduces art to passive reproduction in quality of specified attitudes and views, which discredits the very nature of art, a situation observed in the far from direct links between artistic creativity and other forms of man´s nonmaterial activity. The cultural force of art acts in a mediated manner, revealing itself in flexible and subtle influence on social psychology, in actualization of definite attitude, opinions, and traditions: in this way it forms a definite state of social consciousness and psychology, opening it to absorption of some values and making it unreceptive to others. The mechanisms and channels of this influence of art on the various spheres of spiritual life consist in the fact that the phenomenon of art itself has not remained an abstract identity throughout history but has manifested itself as a mobile and flexible organism, revealing new creative facets and aspects in the course of cultural development. The range of variation of the creative characteristics of art is fairly wide, its ultimate poles are the ideological meaningful and formal hedonistic principles. Different scales of this variation in the orientation of artistic creativity condition the differences in the social function of art in each concrete historical period, its primarily development. These many faces of art do not rule out artistic heritage and continuity.

Artistic works produced by different directions, trends and styles are all rooted in the same specificity of art, expressed in its aesthetic nature. The interpretation of the nature of art as an aesthetic phenomenon permits the identification of the dual role of art in the system of culture: on the one side, art functions as a distinct sphere of culture that has a purpose in itself, and on the other, it is a form of nonmaterial creativity that is capable of changing real relations and can perform important functions. The unique mechanism of artistic reflection, which creates the second reality, is capable of modeling the entire wealth of actual living interconnections and of achieving an integral assimilation of the world, and this predetermines the possibility of reverse impact of art on all spheres of culture. What is essential here is the fact that an artistic model, which aptly reflects or constructs the links and relations of reality, is a construction capable of generating new values, capable of serving as reference for the social psychology and consciousness and frequently surpassing the level of culture attained by society. Artistic creativity thus doesn´t simply illustrate the attainments of other forms of culture but goes its own way, striving for a specific result. At the same time, artistic modeling of reality is by no means limited to functional goals only. Certain sense, a work of art is an aim in itself: artistic content is not an ensemble of verbalized meaning; on the contrary it is always marked by a kind of secret or diddle; it is not reducible to a sum of meaning of the physical images of an object. Values is not only the result of perception of an artistic work but also the process itself, which sets in motion and interaction all of the human psyche and is characterized by a special fusion and interweaving of the emotional and the intellectual, the conscious. A state emerges in the process of aesthetic experience which gives rise to much thinking, although no definite thought, i.e., concept, can be adequate to it. Artistic content is therefore inexpressible in ordinary concepts, it is untranslatable into the language of logic, being always a kind of breakthrough into the future. The dual nature of art thus consists in cultivating the aesthetic principles which, constituting values in themselves, can achieve a fullness of their expression only through correlation with the whole culture. The uniqueness of artistic reflection and influence is not reducible in a true work of art to “pure art”, it is manifested in its actual humanist nature from has been said here that in a sense the artistic is both, reducible and irreducible to the nonartistic. The nonartistic relations and interconnections with the real ones, the specific laws of the artistic world with its inherent illogicalities and contradictions, manifest art´s great creative force, its ability for developing the creative potential in man and, in the whole of culture. In the process of artistic, man is charged with the artist´s creative energy. Owing to the fusion of the sensuous and the ideal, of the material and the spiritual, art personifies the true wealth of man´s attitude to the world, which is not reduced to the wealth ratiocination alone. Owing to this multidimensionality and integrity of the world of art, its essence can perceived as isomorphism with the nature and functions of culture as a whole, so that we can speak of cultural specificity of art.


If we are to see the development of man himself through the results of his activity as the primary goal of culture and art, which expresses man´s most profound interest and cultivates man´s essential power (Marx), are very close to them. In the strict sense, artistic creativity is not merely a form of spiritual activity but spiritual-practical activity. Its result is a new, previously non existent reality, a work of art. It can be asserted in this connection that the levels of society´s spiritual and material culture are reflected in a work of art in sublimated form. History shows that the developing of art is not synchronized with that of material culture. On this basis, quite a few researchers have propounded as pro paradoxical theories which interpreted artistic development of material culture. Of this type were the theories of some religious thinker. In analysis the state and level of development of art in the epoch of Renaissance and in the late 18th early and 19th centuries in Germany. This religious thinkers concluded that it was precisely the paucity of material life that gave rise to the flights of genius and revelations of master of the Renaissance and the German Romanticists. Widely current is also the theory of Oswald Spengler, who singled out in each historical type of culture a period of formation, maturity and old age, and who connected the collapse of spiritual, selfless values with the advance of civilization, the dominance of the material and practical which comes, in his view, at the end. Dialectical Materialist theory of culture overcomes the limitations of those approaches, which see the crisis of bourgeois civilization, as the inevitable end of history. The theory of interaction between the cultural and social provides the methodological basis for analysis the contradictions between society´s material and spiritual development. According to it the cause of the contradictions between material and nonmaterial culture lies in the defective forms of their social being. There are no grounds for the view that spiritual values in the contemporary world are totally and irretrievably debased, and that art is dying. Anti-Materialistic dialectical theoreticians expressing such views (e.g., Adorno- Guardini, Munford- Horkheimer and other ) justifiably criticize the untenability of attempts by the very content of capitalist social relations. At the same time these thinkers raise this state to an absolute, ignoring the practice of social system that shows that these contradictions can be overcome on a new social basis. Dialectical Materialist method demonstrates not only the ultimates dependence of the development of spiritual culture on the character of economic transformations, it also reveals the relative independence of the forms of spiritual production. The periods of rise of spiritual culture, unpredictable in terms of the vulgar sociological view of history, are explained by numerous factors, including the possibility of so-called “self movement” of non material culture, motivated by specific inner continuity, by inheriting and refashioning spiritual tradition While nothing unequal development rates of art and material culture, we can also observe a relative independence of the being of art in the system of nonmaterial culture.


All of that is an indication of the continual migration of the forms of social consciousness in nonmaterial culture, of the rise of some of them and the existence of a leading form of social consciousness in non material culture at each stage of its development. It is in this leading forms of social consciousness that such values are born on which all other forms of artistic and intellectual creativity are oriented, values that provide a single idealogical criterion and form definite dominant of spiritual life. Cultural historical development of Europe shows a succession of leading forms of spiritual assimilation of the world depending on the complex processes in social practice and consciousness. Artistic creativity was the sphere in which the leading spiritual principles of that critical epoch were embodied, namely humanism, assertion of the unity of man and nature, rehabilitation of the sensuously perceived world. Characteristically, in later historical periods, when other forms of nonmaterial production took the lead, the most vital kind of art was each time evolved, that varied from period to period and was capable of expressing most fully the essence of contemporary social consciousness. The modes of artistic expression and the vocabulary of the other kinds of art gravitates as the rule to those of the most vital kind. Thus the spiritual processes of the 19th century stimulated an interest in literature and the development of such genres as the novel and the short story. In the novel, the individual is no longer a representative of a definite group of people, he is endowed with a personal fate and individual consciousness. The portrayal of man in a complex life process, the multidimensionality of the plot involving the lives of numerous characters, proved to be best suited to the embodiment of the new type of world-view in its images. It is also noteworthy that the influence of literature as the most vital kind of art in 19th century was expressed in a growing emphasis on the narrative. Quite naturally the artistic means discovered in that period by literature and adequate to the tasks of artistic assimilation of the leading tendencies and contradictions of the epoch were used by by the other kinds of art in accordance with their own specific tasks and features. The unitary ideological-aesthetic principles of artistic reflection which took shape in the various kinds of art in response to a definite type of a sociocultural situation. The collapse of relatively integral and harmonious view of the world, and the dominance of a world marked by a most acute struggle of contradictions, fluctuations, disharmony, polarization of the individual and the social, the rational and the emotional. By considering the diverse modes of implementation of artistic dramatics trace the change and development of the dramatic element in art in connection with the deepening possibilities of artistic assimilation of the growing conflicts. Artistic dramatics in broad sense reflected a general feature that was inherent in all the conflicts despite their differences in character and modes of resolution: it could achieve the acuteness of a tragedy, or it could be expressed in the form of “serious comedy”(Diderot), it could be contained in the subtext of the work or even be rejected by an optimistic sublimation of contradictions. Dramatist in art makes the axis expressing a special type connection of the contradictions of real life in the imagery of a work and the means of artistic expressiveness.


The development of devices of artistic dramatics significantly enriched the arsenal of art, increasing the possibilities of reflection of fine changes in psychology and permitting the assimilation of the surrounding world as a complex concatenation and polyphony of contradictory elements. The enriched modes of artistic assimilation and the rapid renewal of ideas discrediting of the political sphere as an adequate form of reflection and orientation. The situations become frequent when and ideas matured in the artistic sphere outstripping the parallel quest in science, philosophy or politics, artistic dramatics as a mode of revealing the essence of the opposing forces relations, and tendencies offered great possibilities for revealing the inner dramatist of an individual´s spiritual life. The analysis of the hidden springs of human behavior in the works of Balzac or Zola or Ibsen, considerably enriched our notions of human nature and showed the vast possibilities of psychologist in art. The work of Feodor Dostoevsky was marked by true discoveries in this respect; A writer of enormous intuitive perception and artistic power, he reproduced little-known aspect of man´s inner life, of which psychology has no precise knowledge even today. A number of moral and psychological phenomena, which received a profound artistic elaboration in Dostoevsky´s work´s, largely determined the direction of the search in other spheres of spiritual culture, specially in psychology and philosophy. The crisis of classical rationalism, the undermining of traditional bourgeois world-view reference systems, which became particularly acute at the end of the 19th century, had varied effects on the fates of artistic creativity, it entailed a revision of the tradition, a revolutionary destruction of the old foundations of philosophy, art and politics: also it stimulated these forms of spiritual activity towards intensive mutual exchange and interaction. Beginning with that period such dialogue and parallel quest have been bringing closer together art and psychology. The explanation of the special position of psychology early in the 20th century, and the frequent development of psychologists observations into comprehensive philosophical theories by Freud and Jung or other recently, lay in the desire to find in the irrational and the instinctive possibilities for life orientation that would be broader than those offered by intellect, an allegedly “limited force”, incapable of ensuring the progress of mankind. Similar seeking were also observable in the creativity of many artists who endeavored to free ideas from identity with things, to penetrate into the “ pure idea”, into “spirituality itself”. The changes in the modes of artistic expression at the turn of this century had many causes. There was the striving to penetrate the implicit and the hidden, to perceive the multi-dimensionality of the human being: there was the desire to construct a pure world of art free from the burden of social conflicts; and there were various forms of decadence, of aesthetization of the ugly. Let us note, though , that the crisis of stable ideals in art produces, first, irremediable destruction, giving birth to ugly specimens of “dehumanized consciousness”, but simultaneously tit stimulates the development of art; closed genre boundaries and language forms are broken down and the principles of artistic expression themselves are restructured. The imagery fixed in the tradition is set into motion, making possible new discoveries, refreshing the immediacy of the artistic appeal, and stimulating the acuteness of perception. It is important to stress in analysis that art, in its being in culture, constantly acts as a self-organizing system that actualizes different possibilities at different times and reveals in each new situation new resources and modes of artistic assimilation of the world and orientation in it. It is by no means accidental, for instance, that the theoreticians of intuitivism and psycho analysis at one time believed art to be the most adequate form of philosophical self expression.


This century saw the rise of the cultural authority of natural science, to which entails the danger of universal similarity and standardization, of unification of the forms of spiritual life, communication and behavior. Depreciating the exclusiveness of the individual product. The cult of technology assumed various form of antidemocratic technocratism, ranging from manipulation, trough the mechanism of mass culture to achieve ideological integration to extreme bordering of fascism. The threat of antagonism between the growing rationalization of spiritual life and unpredictability of its results increases the role of the directive factor in culture. Increase of the role of technology in man´s spiritual and practical life has sharpened the problem of individuality, of the personal element in culture, in this connection the role of art as a creative force of culture, safeguarding uniqueness and resisting standardization, is increased. The image full expressiveness in 20th century art, which reshapes the rich traditions of artistic expression, uses indirect semantics, and lays stress on the role of the subtext and the subjective authorial element, appeals to the more complex consciousness and psyche. Simultaneously, greater demands are imposed on artistic perception, which must fully manifest itself as labour and as creativity, as an intense emotional and intellectual experience. Contemporary spiritual life provides evidence of penetration of artistic into philosophical thinking, of the use of artistic in political analysis and explanation of the world. These facts are indicative of the growing cultural mission of art, and they also increase its responsibility. Therefore, whether the given mechanism of social relations predispose the artist towards a humanistically oriented search and direct his creative towards protecting man and whether the system in question is interested in such a development of culture which corresponds to the latter´s objective content becomes a matter of fundamental significance. The concept of the individual´s level of aesthetic culture has been studied by specialists in aesthetics for at least a decades. But the problem of the aesthetic effectiveness of the world, of the specific ways and methods of utilizing this effectiveness for the formation of the new man is only now coming under scrutiny, and the practical level of man´s life, his creative aesthetic potential, and the level of his aesthetic consciousness have not been adequately studied. The individual´s ability for the transformation and creation of the world according to the laws of beauty is no longer a desideratum but an obligatory goal of aesthetic education. The attainments of the goal is linked not only with the individual´s involvement with art, with amateur artistic activities, but also with an understanding, knowledge and feeling for the aesthetic aspect of all kinds of men´s activity, their way of life, and the aesthetics significance of the entire system of social relations, nature and the world created by men themselves.


Of course, art and communication with art provide powerful incentives for the manifestation of man´s creative potential, but all the other types of human activity also posses vast creative possibilities. Aesthetic education cannot be reduced to artistic education only. In the enormous sphere of contacts between man and art, it is absolutely necessary to lead man to broad vision of the feeling for the artistic aspects of the entire range of man´s interactions with the world. However important art may be as a powerful force of intellectual and emotional influence on the individual, his social activity is formed, stimulated and reinforced by art´s depiction of the aesthetic potential of man´s entire life. In fact, for an individual with a through artistic education the beauty of life, of human actions, of the entire system of social relations, and of the mode of life established in society, are revealed in a different light from an individual that has no or few contacts with art. Each sphere of human life is seen by artistically mature individual in an aesthetic light; given the subject´s clearcut psychological-aesthetic attitude it makes a specific impact on his feelings, intellect and will under definite socio-psychological conditions. Besides problems that are common to the development of socially creative activity of different social, occupational and age groups of the population, each such group also has its specific problems that involve specific ways and methods of identification, study and utilization of the aesthetic educational potential of, say, the natural environment not only under urban and rural conditions but also in different climatic and even weather zones. The ability for aesthetic perception is formed in different ways in different population groups, in the same way as aesthetic perception is differently manifested in different kids of activity, demonstrating the extraordinary possibilities of our sense organs: the thresholds of vision, hearing, taste, can vary within very wide limits. All of this expands the colour, sound, and plastic richness of the world which, becoming part of man´s cultural arsenal, is then manifested and functions in is life activity. One of the important aspects aspects of the problem of artist and society is freedoms, which doesn´t rule out its specificity. The realization of the freedom of artistic creativity is organically linked with the other democratic right and freedoms: right to labour and rest, health protection and social security, education and access to culture, freedom of thought and freedom of expression of thought, freedom of conscience and freedom to fight for its own right. The realization of the freedom to create requires suitable material means and conditions.


The artis´s involvement with the people´s life and the progressive ideas of today, his use of the most advanced creative method, facilitate actual exercise of the freedom of creativity. Truly progressive art is imbued with the ideas of humanism and peace. Art and society is an acute ideological problem. In recent years, a new approach has became apparent in moderns aesthetic to the study of vital problems of the evolution in the theory and practice of artistic culture abroad. Its most important feature is dialectical combination of critical research with positive elaboration of the complex and highly controversial scientific problems that been causing ideological confrontations. The ideological aspects of the present day aesthetic quest emerge in their mutual interconnections; their historical determinations come to light. Problem of artistic creativity are considered against a broad historical and cultural background, a stress being made on the political approach to various phenomena of spiritual culture abroad. Critical analysis of the principal direction in contemporary aesthetics and treatment of their problems in terms of specific countries form a basis for broad generalizations, for bringing out the dialectics of the general and the particular in the present day aesthetic situation abroad. The specific laws of art as a whole and its concrete types are revealed, and the main problems characteristic of the numerous trends in modern aesthetic thought today analyzed. In studying the specificity of bourgeois culture, researchers pay attention to the democratic culture abroad opposing it, especially to its socialist elements, ( in a class society). They study the aesthetic views of Dialectical Materialist Historical philosophers, analyze the attitude of bourgeois esthetics's thought to the ideas of socialism, of Dialectical Materialist philosophy, aesthetics and theory of art that exercise a growing influence abroad: on the one side, this influence cannot be ignored, on the other, bourgeois scholars often try to oppose these ideas by revising and falsifying Dialectical Materialist Historical methodology. This is yet another proof of the ideological significance of confrontation in aesthetics. In the 1960s and 80s, these kind philosophers underwent through a serious change. There emerged a tendency towards growing aestheticisation of modern bourgeois philosophical thought, under the influence of the scientific and technological revolution new phenomena appeared in aesthetics and art; changes took place of apparently incompatible aesthetic trends was attempted. The main aesthetic current of the preceding period have also gone through significance changes. For instance, in the late 1960s, the voluntarism ideas characteristic of existentialism assumed a Leftist radical colouring, as is clear, from the evolution of Sartre´s views. Similar processes took place phenomenology, which rapidly grew closer to the aesthetic orientations of the anarchist.

 

 

 

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